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ABSTRACT
LAURA E. JACKSON: MONETARY POLICY IN A ZERO LOWER BOUND
ENVIRONMENT.
(Under the direction of Neville Francis.)
In the wake of the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate
(FFR) target to zero and resorted to unconventional monetary policy. With the nominal FFR
constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), empirical monetary models cannot be estimated
as usual. First, in joint work with Neville Francis and Michael Owyang, we consider whether
standard models of monetary policy can be preserved without breaks. We consider whether
alternative policy instruments can be considered substitutes for the FFR over the ZLB period.
Furthermore, we construct a shadow rate via the methods proposed in Krippner (2012) and Wu
and Xia (2014) to proxy for the stance of policy. We ask whether the shadow rate is a su¢ cient
representation of the policy instrument or if the nancial crisis requires other modications.
We nd that, if using a dataset that spans the pre-ZLB and ZLB environments, the shadow
rate acts as a fairly good proxy for monetary policy by producing impulse responses similar
to what wed expect based on the non-ZLB benchmark. However, the linear model exhibits a
structural break at the onset of the ZLB and the shadow rate may be insu¢ cient for examining
the ZLB period in isolation.
Second, I describe the joint dynamics of bond yields, monetary policy and macroeconomic
variables within a no-arbitrage a¢ ne term structure framework while explicitly modeling the
ZLB using the shadow rate. I include data on the unemployment gap and ination to build
a more comprehensive stance of policy, incorporating the inuences of unconventional instru-
ments introduced to combat the Great Recession. I nd that shadow rate models incorporating
macroeconomic factors suggest a more negative shadow rate and a longer expected duration
of the ZLB episode than models including only nancial data. Also, including the macro data
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allows the model to better capture the shift in policy focus towards targeting longer-term
yields. Finally, the shadow rate produces a proxy for the stance of policy that suggests the
unconventional programs achieved a substantial accommodation, in excess of that prescribed
by a standard policy rule.
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CHAPTER 1 FOREWORD
The global recession of 2008-2009, driven mainly by the nancial crisis in the U.S., triggered
unprecedented responses in both scal and monetary policy. Traditional economic theory
suggests that, in normal times, the short-term interest rate (Federal Funds rate) provides a
clear indicator of the stance of monetary policy and allows consumers and investors to discern
the intent of the central bank. The Federal Reserve targets a lower (higher) policy rate in order
to stimulate (contract) the economy in response to business cycle uctuations. To combat the
recent recession, the Fed lowered short-term interest rates to near-zero levels to make it easier
for businesses and households to borrow and invest. Nominal interest rates cannot become
negative if currency exists since money pays zero interest and investors would rather hold
cash than earn a negative return. Therefore, the Federal Funds rate (henceforth referred to
as FFR) being near zero for an extended period forced the adoption of alternative policies to
drive economic growth.
The Fed introduced programs such as quantitative easing and large-scale purchases of long-
term assets, including mortgage-backed securities. In doing so, the Fed sought to lower interest
rates in the housing market and on other long-term nancial assets to ease borrowing costs and
encourage investment. These unconventional programs represent a diversion from traditional
policy as described by models of monetary economics. Therefore, these models must either
include more policy instruments or introduce some sort of transitional structural change in the
operating procedures of the Fed during this time.
Economists are tasked with redening the policy rate to absorb the e¤ects of these
alternative programs and thus give a more accurate description of the stance of monetary
policy. To this end, my research expands upon current models of estimating a shadow policy
rate which incorporates the unconventional aspects of policy and underlies the behavior of the
central bank. Although market interest rates are necessarily nonnegative, the shadow rate
may become negative during periods of extremely loose monetary policy. One can construct
this shadow rate by estimating a model of the term structure of interest rates, anchored by
the Feds policy rate. Typical term structure models do not control for the inability of short-
term rates to fall below zero. This dissertation estimates various models accounting for this
constraint and analyzes how the alternative programs a¤ected the true and perceived stances
of monetary policy throughout the Great Recession.
In Section 1.1, I summarize the existing literature on measuring monetary policy at the
ZLB. Many studies have sought to discern the e¤ects of unconventional policy instruments by
conducting event-studies around their introduction.
In Chapter 2, joint work with Neville Francis and Michael Owyang, we consider whether
the standard empirical model of monetary policy can be preserved without breaks. We test
whether alternative policy instruments (e.g., the size of the balance sheet) can be considered
substitutes for the FFR over the ZLB period. That is, we ask whether, during the ZLB
period, there exists a relationship between the FFR and the alternative instruments so that
the standard monetary policy vector autoregression (VAR) dynamics can be preserved. We
propose controlling for the size of the Feds balance sheet and information on alternative
policy announcements to represent policy action during the ZLB period from 2009:Q1 through
2012:Q4. We included these additional variables in a VAR to determine whether we could
produce the same impulse responses of key macroeconomic indicators in the ZLB environment
as those generated in baseline post-WWII macroeconomic models. We found that the balance
sheet and policy events appear to produce an accurate representation of policy during this
period but may be ine¢ cient to use for future empirical work once we return to a normal, non-
ZLB environment and these policies are no longer in use. Next, we test whether the shadow
rate is a su¢ cient representation of the policy instrument or if the nancial crisis requires
other modications to the monetary model. We nd that the shadow rate acts as a fairly good
proxy for monetary policy, if using a dataset that spans the pre-ZLB period throughout the
ZLB environment, and produces impulse responses of macro indicators similar to what wed
expect based on the post-WWII, non-ZLB benchmark. However, it may still be insu¢ cient
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for examining the ZLB period in isolation.
In Chapter 3, I expand this framework using economic indicators to establish the rela-
tionship between interest rates, monetary policy and macroeconomic uctuations. I construct
a macro-nance shadow rate model which extends the current shadow rate methodologies to
incorporate information on key macroeconomic indicators when constructing the perceived
stance of policy through the ZLB period. An expansive literature has developed which recog-
nizes the value of modeling the macroeconomy and nancial markets together. The Fed sets
policy to inuence the availability of money and credit, thus establishing a direct channel link-
ing policy and nancial market activity. Furthermore, actions of the Federal Open Markets
Committee (FOMC) are closely watched by nancial markets while the FOMC itself extracts
information about the current state of the economy from interest rates before setting policy.
I construct three di¤erent versions of the shadow rate model, di¤ering in the extent to which
I allow the macro data to inuence term structure dynamics. First, in the Macro-Finance
model, I incorporate macro uctuations as factors which directly inuence the shadow short-
term rate. According to this interest rate reaction function, the Fed sets monetary policy in
response to the current state of the economy and makes adjustments according to changes in
ination and real activity. Including a latent factor to represent unobserved shocks to policy, I
anchor the term structure with a shadow short rate directly inuenced by macro uctuations.
Secondly, in the Macro-Monetary model, I restrict the observable dynamics to describe the
shadow rate as only a function of latent nancial factors, prohibiting the macro factors from
directly feeding back into the term structure. Based upon a standard monetary VAR, I model
the unemployment gap and ination as responding to lagged policy rates. I extract additional
information from observations on macro indicators each period to lter the path of the shadow
rate. Finally, for comparison to existing studies, I construct the shadow rate using only interest
rate data in the Finance model.
The results suggest that it is inappropriate to use only the Federal Funds rate to represent
policy in a dataset which spans both normal and ZLB environments. The shadow rate model
produces a more comprehensive measurement of monetary policy at the ZLB by capturing how
the Fed has changed focus over time in targeting short-, medium-, or long-term interest rates.
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Furthermore, utilizing macro data in a reactionary way, as in the Macro-Monetary model,
is more appropriate than models allowing the macro uctuations to feedback into the term
structure. Finally, the shadow rate produces a proxy for the stance of policy that suggests
the unconventional policy programs achieved a substantial accommodation, in excess of that
prescribed by a standard policy rule.
1.1 Literature on Monetary Policy in a ZLB Environment
Bernanke & Reinhart (2004) discuss various strategies for stimulating the economy facing
the ZLB when the short-term policy rate cannot be lowered any further. These strategies
include the use of forward guidance to assure investors that the Fed will hold short-rates low
for a longer period into the future than may be expected by nancial markets, changing the
composition of the Feds balance sheet to adjust the relative supplies of securities of di¤erent
maturities available in the market, and quantitative easing to increase the size of the balance
sheet beyond that required to keep the policy rate near zero. The use of these alternative tools
signals to the public that the Fed can still enact e¤ective policy even when traditional policy
in not applicable. In related work, Bernanke et al. (2004) use a variety of empirical nance
methods to gauge the potential e¤ectiveness of unconventional monetary policy programs in
a ZLB environment. The authors conduct an event-study analysis to measure the response
of nancial markets to various central bank announcements. Also, they estimate di¤erent no-
arbitrage VAR models of bond yields using only observable macroeconomic factors to describe
the term structure. In the VAR models, they establish a direct link between the term structure
and observable economic conditions which makes it easy to see how unconventional policies
can be e¤ective. They nd that policymakers still can inuence expectations of future policy
even when the current FFR falls to zero. By convincing nancial markets that it will maintain
low policy rates for longer than expected, the Fed can reduce long-term interest rates and
stimulate real economic activity.
Williams (2010) discusses the implications of extended ZLB episodes for the e¢ cacy of
monetary policy. In the wake of severe, prolonged recessions accompanied by deation, stan-
dard open-market operations are insu¢ cient to return ination to its target. As a result, the
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monetary authority must seek alternative sources of stimulus. In response to a sluggish recov-
ery and deationary scare, the Fed incorporated recommendations from mainstream research
and cut the policy rate to a very low level. Once exhausting its traditional policy instrument,
the FOMC used policy statements to communicate expectations for the contour of the future
path of policy. Also, the FOMC communicated its patience in removing policy accommodation
by stating that it anticipated economic conditions would warrant exceptionally low levels of
the FFR for an extended period. This language remained vague enough to avoid committing
to specic values of the policy rate and to avoid forcing market expectations to abide by a
particular timeline.
A key motivation of the large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs was to lower interest
rates paid by households and businesses to support consumption and investment spending.
Wright (2011) conducts an event-study analysis to determine how nancial markets responded
to the FOMC news. After November 2008, estimated monetary policy shocks signicantly
a¤ected 10-year Treasury yields and long-maturity corporate bond yields but the e¤ects lasted
only a few months. Furthermore, policy shocks had a small e¤ect on 2-year Treasury yields.
The existence of a relationship between aggregate demand and long-term interest rates would
suggest that unconventional monetary policy at the ZLB had a stimulative e¤ect on the econ-
omy, albeit rather modest.
Swanson & Williams (2013) measure the e¤ects of the ZLB on interest rates of all matu-
rities by examining the sensitivity of interest rates to announcements about macroeconomic
conditions. Over the period from 2008 through 2010, yields on Treasuries with more than one
year to maturity were very responsive to macro news, indicative of how monetary and scal
policy were as e¤ective as in normal times. By late 2011, once the ZLB environment had per-
sisted for an extended period, the sensitivity fell considerably and almost entirely muted the
responsiveness of interest rates to macro news. The authors o¤er the explanation that market
participants may have begun to expect the FFR target to be above zero four quarters in the fu-
ture so medium- and long-term yields ceased to respond to cyclical news. The unconventional
policy actions of the Fed may also have helped to o¤set the e¤ects of news announcements.
If the central bank can commit to future values of the policy rate, it can circumvent the ZLB
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constraint by promising accommodative monetary policy in the future once the constraint no
longer binds.
Bauer (2011) performs another event-study analysis of U.S. policies implemented in the
ZLB environment. He constructs a simple three-factor GATSM that accounts for heterogeneity
of shocks to interest rates stemming from di¤erent types of macro news announcements and
policy surprises. Daily interest rate changes are driven mostly by news announcements due to
changes in expectations of future policy rates and unexpected changes in risk-premia. Also,
news about inationary pressures can move the long end of the term structure. The event-study
of Gagnon et al. (2011a) examines changes in interest rates within one-day windows around
o¢ cial communications regarding asset purchases. The authors nd evidence that LSAPs led
to economically meaningful and persistent reductions in longer-term rates. This was likely
driven by lower risk premiums and lower expectations of future short rates. Furthermore,
Neely (2013) nds that announcements of LSAPs by the Fed had substantial global e¤ects
and reduced international long-term yields and the spot value of the dollar. This further
suggests that central banks can enact e¤ective monetary policy even when constrained by the
ZLB.
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CHAPTER 2 MONETARY POLICY ANALYSIS AFTER THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS
2.1 Introduction
Since the onset of the Financial Crisis and Great Recession, monetary policy in the U.S. and
around the world has taken unprecedented measures in an e¤ort to stimulate the economy.
The Federal Reserve, for example, lowered its primary policy instrument the federal funds
target essentially to zero.1 At that point, this instrument became ine¤ective due to the
nominal bound at zero and the Fed was forced to resort to unconventional monetary policy.2
From the standpoint of academics, this period presents an important problem for assessing
the e¤ects of monetary policy. Many monetary models use the e¤ective nominal fed funds
rate as the primary policy instrument. With the nominal funds rate constrained by the zero
lower bound (ZLB) for an extended period, empirical monetary models cannot be estimated
as usual.
The empirical literature o¤ers a number of remedies. First, we could treat the ZLB period
as special, using either breaks or dummies to represent changes in economic relationships.3
Second, we could include alternative policy instruments, such as the size of the balance sheet or
dummies representing the implementation of unconventional policies. These two alternatives
1Friedman (2010) describes a detailed timeline of the sequence of steps taken by the Fed along with signicant
market events. Williams (2011) presents a review of the unconventional monetary policy tactics employed to
combat the nancial crisis.
2Unconventional monetary policy used in the U.S. included quantitiative easing (QE), large scale asset
purchases (LSAPs), and forward guidance. Walsh (2010) discusses the channels through which quantitative
easing could stabilize the economy. Wright (2011) analyzes how long-term interest rates respond to LSAPs in
a ZLB environment. Gagnon et al. (2011b) present the mechanisms through which these purchases a¤ect the
overall macroeconomy. Campbell et al. (2012) discuss the e¤ects of forward guidance.
3This option could be considered the most extreme as it suggests that the e¤ect of monetary policy is
potentially time-varying [see, for example, Aastveit et al. (2014)]. If the e¤ectiveness of policy varies, the Fed
must reconsider at each moment the conduct of policy and the appropriate instruments.
have the disadvantage of increasing the number of estimated parameters for a period that,
presumably, represents a short sample. Third, we could replace the FFR as the conventional
stance of monetary policy with a proxy that is allowed to violate the ZLB and that captures
the e¤ects of both conventional and unconventional policy.
Since the nancial crisis, academics have proposed such measures of the accommodation in
monetary policy when the short rate is at the zero lower bound. Recently, Krippner (2012) and
Wu & Xia (2014) have used the shadow rate methodology to construct alternative measures
of the stance of policy. Krippner (2012) builds on Black (1995) and Gorovoi & Linetsky
(2004), modeling interest rates as options by calculating the value of a call option to hold
cash.4 The modications in Krippner (2012) generate closed-form solutions for bond prices
and yields. Rather than describing yields in a ZLB environment directly, Wu & Xia (2014)
construct an analytical approximation of forward rates in discrete time. This allows for a more
straightforward estimation approach than the other shadow rate methodologies and produces
closed-form expressions for the shadow forward rates. Both models calculate a shadow short-
term interest rate which would be seen in nancial markets if the cash option did not exist. In
principle, the Fed may have dropped the fed funds rate further if not for the nominal bound
at zero. The shadow rate has been considered a proxy for the stance of monetary policy in an
environment in which the zero lower bound is binding. From this foundation one can develop
a full model of the shadow term structure based upon the shadow short rate depicting the
fundamental policy objectives.
Most previous empirical models of the e¤ects of policy were linear. If these shadow short
rates are proper measures of the monetary accommodation, the underlying model would, in
the best of worlds, still be linear and consistent across sub-periods. In this paper, we compare
some of these new measures of monetary policy. We consider whether the standard empirical
4Black (1995) modied the typical Gaussian a¢ ne term structure model (GATSM) to eliminate the occur-
rence of negative interest rates by introducing the idea of interest rates as options. Nominal interest rates
cannot take on negative values in a world in which cash is a viable alternative to standard short-term assets.
Since cash essentially pays zero interest, should nominal bonds pay a negative interest rate, investors would have
an arbitrage opportunity by issuing bonds at negative interest rates and using the borrowed funds to purchase
cash, earning a zero rate of interest. Black (1995) introduced the concept of a shadow instantaneous interest
rate which is free to take on negative values while the nominal interest rate is the positive part of the shadow
rate due to the always present option to convert an asset to currency.
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model of monetary policy can be preserved without breaks by using these measures. That is, we
ask whether, during the ZLB period, there exists a linear relationship between the alternative
instruments and standard macroeconomic variables so that the standard linear VAR can be
preserved.
The question going forward is whether these new alternative shadow short rates are su¢ -
cient representations of monetary policy or if the nancial crisis requires other modications
to the monetary model. We ask the following questions: (1) How large are the biases in the
estimated impulse responses if one uses the FFR for the full sample? (2) Does adding policy
dummies and the balance sheet of the Fed mitigate these biases? (3) Does replacing the e¤ec-
tive funds rate a shadow short rate mitigate these biases? (4) Which shadow short rate does
a better job at mitigating these biases?
We nd that the shadow rate acts as a fairly good proxy for monetary policy, if using
a dataset that spans the pre-ZLB period throughout the ZLB environment, by producing
impulse responses of macro indicators similar to what wed expect based on the post-WWII,
non-ZLB benchmark. However, the linear model exhibits a signicant structural break at the
onset of the ZLB and the shadow rate may still be insu¢ cient for examining the ZLB period
in isolation.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 establishes the benchmark
specication using standard empirical models to describe Fed policy in a normal, pre-ZLB
environment. Section 2.3 examines how we can model some of the actions taken by the
Fed at the zero lower bound in these standard models. In this section, we consider whether
standard empirical models of monetary policy can be salvaged, either using new measures of
policy, allowing for breaks in the e¤ects of policy, and/or accounting for unconventional policy
instruments. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The Benchmark Specication
The short rate often, an overnight rate is one of the primary instruments for conducting
monetary policy. When adverse shocks are large, monetary accommodation can drive the short
rate close to zero. In practice, no-arbitrage conditions prevent nominal rates from falling below
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zero since agents can substitute out of bonds into cash. This feature of nominal interest rates
can prevent a proper evaluation of the stance of monetary policy when the short rate is at or
near zero and other instruments must be relied upon to conduct policy. In this section, we
estimate a standard monetary VAR for the pre-crisis period (1960:I-2007:IV) and then naïvely
extend the analysis with data for the nancial crisis period.
Before we can determine whether empirical models of monetary policy have changed, we
must rst establish a baseline. We estimate a quarterly four-variable VAR(4) in output, in-
ation, commodity prices, and a policy instrument.5 For the baseline model, we include the
e¤ective FFR as the policy instrument:
Yt = A (L)Yt 1 + "t;
where A (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator, "t  N (0;), and we suppress the constant
and any trends for notational simplicity. The monetary shock is identied by assuming that
FFR can react to macro variables but the macro variables cannot contemporaneously react to
shocks to the FFR. Partitioning A (L) into blocks will facilitate exposition: Let Xt represent
the three macro variables of interest and Rt represent the FFR. Then, we can rewrite the VAR
as:
264 Xt
Rt
375 =
264 AX (L) ARX (L)
AXR (L) AR (L)
375
264 Xt 1
Rt 1
375+
264 "xt
"rt
375 ;
where AX (L) represents the e¤ects of changes in the lagged macro variables on each other,
ARX (L) represents the e¤ects of policy on the macro variables, AXR (L) represents the feed-
back from macro variables to policy, and AR (L) represents the possible persistence in FFR.
The baseline data sample covers the period from 1960:I to 2007:IV, which starts after the
Korean War price control period and ends prior to the nancial crisis and generally corresponds
with the standard VAR used for monetary analysis prior to the FFR hitting the zero lower
5Our measure of output is the annualized quarterly di¤erence in the log of GDP taken from the BEA.
Ination is taken as the di¤erence in the log of the CPI taken from the BLS. Commodity prices are the log
di¤erences in the Producer Price Index: All Commodities. All data are seasonally adjusted.
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bound.6
The rst column of Figure B.1 shows the impulse responses for the VAR(4) outlined above
using the e¤ective nominal FFR as the policy instrument and data for the period ending in
2007:IV. The responses shown are to a 25 basis point shock to the e¤ective nominal FFR
ordered last in the VAR and identied using the Cholesky decomposition. The responses are
computed for each draw of the sampler, generating the posterior coverage. The plots show
the median response (black line) as well as the 95-percent posterior coverage intervals (blue
shaded regions). The impulse responses are as expected: An increase in the policy rate causes
output to fall and ination to rise in the short run.
We next examine one of the challenges faced by academics posed by the ZLB period.
We rst estimate a linear VAR for the full sample (1960:I-2013:III) to show how the impulse
responses would change if one did not account for the use of alternative monetary instruments.
This VAR is what one would obtain by naïvely extending the sample through the ZLB period
without accounting for the use of alternative monetary instruments.
The second column of Figure B.1 shows the impulse responses for the VAR(4) outlined
above using the e¤ective nominal FFR as the policy instrument through the ZLB period.
The plots show the median responses (dark green line) as well their associated 68-percent
posterior coverage intervals (green shaded region) for the naive full-sample VAR extending
the data through 2013:III. The thick dark blue lines and blue shaded regions give the impulse
response median point estimates and their 68-percent posterior coverage for the benchmark
specication in which the data end in 2007:IV. The responses resemble those of the baseline in
both quantitative and qualitative terms a contractionary policy shock results in a decrease in
output, a recognizable price puzzle with increasing ination, and increasing commodity prices.
The nominal funds rate does not move during the ZLB period. The ZLB period does not
qualitatively change the resulting impulse responses to a monetary shock but does produce a
slight quantitative bias. However, this exercise does not tell us much about the ZLB period
6To preserve consistency with results in later sections, the VAR presented here is estimated with Bayesian
methods. The prior is a zero mean Normal-inverse Wishart distribution. The posterior distributions are
simulated using the Gibbs sampler.
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itself since the conventional policy instrument e¤ectively does nothing during this period.
While the estimates are slightly biased, we can still e¤ectively describe what happens in normal
times but we do not know what happens in the ZLB period.
2.2.1 Testing for Parameter Instability
To model the ZLB period, one could impose a break at the time that the e¤ective nominal
funds rate hit the bound.7 We compare the pre- and full-sample VAR by conducting formal
tests to determine the extent to which the model changed during the nancial crisis. First,
we compare Bayes Factors to determine the likelihood of parameter instability between the
pre-ZLB and the crisis/ZLB period. We construct a dummy variable to indicate data from the
crisis and post-crisis recovery ZLB period and test for varied responses of macro variables to
the policy instrument over the transition to the ZLB environment. In each of the rst three
VAR equations, we include an interaction between the ZLB dummy variable and all lags of
the policy rate. Therefore, the break model allows for a change in the VAR coe¢ cients on the
policy rate.8
We take twice the log of the Bayes Factor comparing the break model to the no-break
model in order to convert the test statistic into a scale comparable to that of the likelihood
ratio test statistic. Let  (Y jMi) be the marginal likelihood of the data, given model Mi and
dene model M0 and M1 as the no-break and break model models, respectively.9 Therefore,
the Bayes Factor is computed as:
B01 =
 (Y jMi)
 (Y jM0) ; (2.1)
7We assume that the onset of any potential paramter instability would take place after 2007:IV. Throughout
2008, the U.S. economy experienced substantial negative shocks, forcing the Fed to make drastic cuts in the
FFR towards the ZLB. Once dropping the FFR target as low as possible at the end of 2008, the Fed sought
unconventional measures to produce additional stimulus. We seek to measure how the overall macroeconomic
dynamics may have changed throughout this transition.
8This treatment is equvalent to modeling ARX (L) of the VAR in Section 2.2 di¤erently in each period.
9We compute the marginal likelihood using the output of the Gibbs sampler with the method described in
Chib (1995).
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and we compute
B01 = 2 ln (B01) : (2.2)
We use the scale suggested in Je¤reys (1961) to interpret the strength of evidence against
modelM0 and in favor of modelM1, where values of B01 > 6 are considered strong evidence in
favor of the break model. Negative values of B01 indicate that the no-break model is preferred.
The rst line of Table B.1 shows B01 for the model comparison using the e¤ective FFR as the
monetary instrument for the entire post-war sample (1960:I-2013:III) and for the post-Great
Moderation sample (1984:I-2013:III). We nd strong evidence against the model with constant
parameters using each of the two sub-samples, respectively. The results favor the model with
parameter instability over the baseline model, thus suggesting some added explanatory value
by allowing the parameters to change when the economy encounters the ZLB.
2.3 Monetary Policy at the ZLB
Ideally, we want to be able to account for the e¤ects of the Feds unconventional policy action
during the times in which the FFR does not uctuate. Using the FFR alone to represent policy
would suggest that the Fed was inactive during the depths of the nancial crisis and did little
to stimulate the recovery. Therefore, we need a way to incorporate the policy accommodation
associated with the balance sheet liquidity programs and the use of forward guidance. In the
next section, we augment the VAR with announcement e¤ects and the Feds balance sheet to
determine whether accounting for alternative policy instruments are su¢ cient to preserve the
dynamic responses suggested by the benchmark VAR model. Finally, we estimate a shadow
rate and use this as a proxy for the policy instrument during the ZLB period.
2.3.1 Adding Alternative Monetary Instruments
As we mentioned above, during the ZLB period, the Federal Reserve began to utilize alternative
policy measures. These measures were intended to provide temporary injections of liquidity and
often targeted yields for longer maturity assets. These policies also represented a substantial
increase in the Feds balance sheet. One way to model the e¤ects of these unconventional
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policies is include them directly in the VAR by using dummy variables.
Augmenting the standard VAR model to account for the use of these instruments is not
straightforward. The policies are often thought to have both implementation e¤ects and an-
nouncement e¤ects that is, the stance of policy could be thought to change both at the times
the programs were announced and at the times the balance sheet actually changed.10 One way
to add these instruments into the model is to include event dummies for announcements and
to include changes in the size of the Feds balance sheet. Let Bt represent the di¤erence in the
size of the Feds balance sheet from t   1 to t and let Pt be a dummy variable that indicates
the announcement of a future Fed action. Then, the VAR becomes
264 Xt
Rt
375 =
264 AX (L) ARX (L)
AXR (L) AR (L)
375
264 Xt 1
Rt 1
375+
264 ABX (L) APX (L)
0 0
375
264 Bt 1
Pt 1
375+
264 "Xt
"Rt
375 ;
where the zero restrictions impose orthogonality between the unconventional policies and the
e¤ective funds rate.
We can then determine whether accounting for alternative policy instruments is su¢ cient to
preserve the structure of the VAR into the ZLB period: Does including ABX (L) and APX (L)
make the VAR consistent across the ZLB period? The second line of Table B.1 shows the
results of the Bayes Factor comparing VARs with exogenous controls for Bt and Pt in the
equations for Xt, with and without parameter instability at the ZLB. The evidence against
the model with constant parameters is even stronger than when using only the FFR, as in the
previous section. The additional Bt and Pt terms come into play primarily around the early
stages of the nancial crisis and over the period witnessing drastic cuts in the FFR towards
the ZLB. Incorporating these additional dynamics emphasizes the variation underlying the
structural form of the model and amplies the importance of allowing for parameter instability.
This very strong evidence favoring changing coe¢ cients over constant coe¢ cients suggests
that accounting for the unconventional policy via event dummies is not su¢ cient to maintain
10One might even argue that markets anticipated the announcements, either independently or through
speeches made by FOMC members, further complicating the identication of these e¤ects.
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linearity.
Figure B.1 compares the impulse responses to a shock to the FFR in the benchmark to the
VAR that includes Bt and Pt. As in the previous analysis, the right-hand column shows the
median point estimate and 68-percent posterior coverage intervals for the impulse responses
estimated using the full-sample VAR, with Bt and Pt. The dark blue lines and blue shaded
regions replicate the benchmark results. The median point estimates of the full-sample seem
to deviate only slightly from the benchmark, with a more signicant change for the response
of commodity prices, but the posterior coverage is considerably wider. Introducing additional
structure into the model and requiring estimation of the coe¢ cients on Bt and Pt degrade the
precision with which the rest of the model parameters are estimated.
Similar to the results above, accounting for the FFR, the balance sheet, and signicant
policy events produces a su¢ cient representative of policy for the full post-war period, including
a majority of non-ZLB data. However, augmenting the model in this way may be an ine¢ cient
approach for future empirical work once the policy environment returns to a normal, non-
ZLB environment and these unconventional policies are no longer in use. The Fed has a
variety of alternative policy programs in its arsenal but does not need to use them when it can
adjust the FFR e¤ectively. Including Bt and Pt introduces more parameters to estimate and
more structure in the model, especially if imposing identifying restrictions in terms of their
relationships with the other variables in the model. In response to this, we pose the question:
can we nd a proxy measurement of Rt that captures the stance of policy across all periods?
We attempt to answer this question in the remainder of the paper.
2.3.2 Shadow Short Rates
One of the Feds stated objectives in conducting unconventional monetary policy was to a¤ect
interest rates for longer maturity assets, suggesting that examining the term structure of
interest rates could uncover a potential alternative policy instrument. Because the nominal
short rate is constrained during the ZLB period, Black (1995) proposed a model with a ctitious
shadow bond with the same maturity as the policy instrument and an unconstrained shadow
interest rate. The nominal short rate, Rt, can then be expressed as the maximum of the
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shadow short rate, rt, and zero:
Rt = max frt; 0g : (2.3)
When the nominal rate binds at the ZLB, the shadow rate is unconstrained and can fall below
zero. Krippner (2012), Wu & Xia (2014), and Christensen & Rudebusch (2013) estimate
versions of this shadow rate using nancial market data spanning the full term structure.
Krippner (2012) modies the Black (1995) framework of modeling interest rates as options by
calculating the value of a call option to hold cash. This methodology includes two latent factors
with a series of restrictive normalizations in order to apply the option-pricing framework.
Krippner (2012) uses numerical integration to generate closed-form solutions for bond prices
and yields within the shadow term structure. Christensen & Rudebusch (2013) apply the
option-based pricing approach formalized by Krippner (2012) to estimate the rst three-factor
shadow rate model using data on Japanese government bond yields. Alternatively, Wu & Xia
(2013) construct an analytical approximation of forward rates in discrete time. This allows
for a more straightforward estimation approach than the other shadow rate methodologies.
The authors include three latent factors and apply the normalization technique introduced by
Joslin et al. (2011).
Krippner (2012) and Wu & Xia (2014) argue that the shadow rate can be used to measure
the stance of monetary policy when nominal rates hit the ZLB. The shadow rate, however, is a
purely nancial construct that does not take into account its e¤ects on macro variables. If we
are to use the shadow rate in empirical models of monetary policy, we need to know whether
standard VAR models can be extended through the ZLB period by replacing the e¤ective FFR
with the exogenously constructed shadow rate or if the ZLB period, in and of itself, requires
an alternative model.
Following the methodology of Krippner (2012), we construct the shadow rate use data on
the full yield curve, out to the 30-year Treasury bond. The dataset spans 1986:IV through
2013:III so, in principle, we can derive a shadow rate for this entire period. However, we will
only need the shadow rate values to proxy for the FFR once hitting the ZLB. The details
of Krippners model and the estimation procedure are described in the appendix. Krippners
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method generates a monthly shadow rate. However, in order to use this as the policy instru-
ment in the VAR(4) analysis, we aggregate over the quarter by averaging the estimated values
for the shadow rate over each quarter. The shadow rate developed in Wu & Xia (2014) is
made publicly available on Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta website. We convert the monthly
frequency to a quarterly frequency in the same way as with our version of Krippners shadow
rate.
Figure B.3 shows a sub-sample from 2006:I-2013:III of the quarterly policy instruments
used for estimation in the VAR. Prior to 2009:I, all policy instruments use observed values of
the nominal FFR. From 2009:I through the end of the sample, we substitute the two shadow
rate measures for the e¤ective fed funds rate in separate VARs. By construction, when the
nominal FFR is su¢ ciently far from zero, it and the shadow rate move consistently together.
The shadow rate should be equal to the nominal short rate when the nominal short rate is
positive and the model preserves this relationship up to a small measurement error. However,
once the FFR e¤ectively reaches the ZLB in 2008:IV, the shadow rate becomes increasingly
more negative as the Fed took action to jump-start the economy.
Therefore, as a third alternative treatment option for the ZLB period, we estimate the
same VAR(4) as above with this new hybrid policy measurement. Lines 3 and 4 of Table 1
show results of the Bayes Factor model comparisons using both the Krippner (2012) and Wu
& Xia (2014) shadow rates as the policy instrument, respectively. Similar to the case with
using the FFR, the linear VAR using the Wu & Xia (2014) shadow rate still favors the model
incorporating parameter instability around 2008:I, after the onset of the nancial crisis. There
is very strong evidence in favor of the model allowing for a shift in the macro responses over the
entire post-war sample. The evidence is still positive, but much less strong for the post-Great
Moderation subsample. Conversely, when using the Krippner (2012) shadow rate, the results
favor the constant parameter model for both the full post-war or the post-Great Moderation
samples. This shadow rate exhibits much richer dynamics over the crisis and ZLB periods,
taking on greater negative values. It appears that this variation, in contrast to the FFR or
the smoother path of the Wu & Xia (2014) shadow rate, allows the Krippner (2012) shadow
rate to provide a better proxy for the policy instrument in the VAR setting.
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These results elicit the question: is the shadow rate a su¢ cient proxy for the stance of policy
to preserve the linearity in the monetary models? Figure B.4 shows the impulse responses of
the VAR using the shadow rates substituted for the e¤ective funds rate at the ZLB. The
rst column repeats the benchmark using the FFR from 1960:1-2007:IV from Figure B.1.
The center column estimates the VAR with the Krippner (2012) shadow rate as the policy
instrument from 2009:I-2013:III and the right column estimates the VAR with the Wu &
Xia (2014) shadow rate as the policy instrument. Using either shadow rate to represent policy
generates posterior coverages for the responses of all macro variables similar to the benchmark.
The median benchmark responses fall within the posterior coverage for the full-sample analyses
in all cases except for a small bias on the persistence of the policy shocks e¤ect on the policy
rate itself. Again, the ZLB period itself is very short compared to the entire sample and the
lack of signicant di¤erences in responses may be due to the stronger inuence of pre-ZLB data.
Even with the subtle di¤erences noted here, the shadow rates seem to preserve the qualitative
(and much of the quantitative) relationships between our macroeconomic indicators and the
e¤ects of monetary policy actions.
We are interested in whether the shadow rate provides a su¢ cient proxy for monetary policy
in the ZLB environment, in particular to explain the e¤ects of policy throughout the economic
contraction of the recent recession. The objective is to use the shadow rate to represent the
signicant policy stimulus associated with unconventional policies when the FFR does not
deviate from the ZLB. The substantial downward movement of the shadow rate occurs in the
early stages of the Great Recession, with increasingly negative shadow rates while the FFR is
near zero.
Wu & Xia (2014) treat this period di¤erently than the subsequent ZLB period once the
economy is no longer in recession but the FFR is still near zero and unconventional policies
are still in use. They argue for using the shadow rate to model policy action only after the
recessionary conditions subside. We would like to construct a comprehensive measure of policy
even during the recessionary period. The large negative shocks that pushed the economy into
recession and drove the FFR towards zero are important for determining the validity of the
shadow rate approach to modeling policy in these abnormal environments.
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We re-estimate the VAR and include only the period after the onset of the ZLB to look
specically at economic conditions when the shadow rate should provide more information
than the FFR alone.11 Figure B.5 shows the impulse responses of the benchmark VAR(4)
and then using the shadow rates over the period from 2008:I through 2013:III, isolating the
period during which we model the ZLB as binding. During this time the nominal FFR hardly
uctuated from zero and thus could not e¤ect much change itself on the overall economy. The
shadow rates incorporate other external inuences on both current policy as well as market
expectations of future policy and future economic conditions. Thus, the responses of macro
aggregates to shocks to this alternative policy measurement illustrate more comprehensive
policy action during the severe economic contraction.
The impulse responses are estimated with much less precision and the posterior coverage
is considerably wider for the VAR shadow rate estimation using only ZLB data than for the
benchmark. As a result, the median benchmark responses tend to fall within the considerably
wide posterior coverage. The median point estimate of the response of output is comparable
when examining the benchmark and using the Wu-Xia shadow rate over the ZLB period. The
Krippner shadow rate does not induce a contractionary response until after one period but then
moves in a similar fashion to the benchmark. Not surprisingly, the median responses of ination
and commodity prices still uctuate from the benchmark. The response of ination implies a
price puzzle in the benchmark but neither of the shadow rates replicate this type of response
during the ZLB period. Contractionary policy shocks are associated with falling ination
using either shadow rate. As we previously discussed, the shadow rate may incorporate future
expectations as it extracts data from interest rates and investment decisions. Finally, while
the response of the policy rate to its own shocks dissipates more quickly with the shadow rates
than the benchmark, the qualitative nature of the response matches that of the FFR in normal
times. 12
11Of course, given the data limitations for this period, error bands are expected to be large and results will
be only suggestive.
12For robustness, we repeat these impulse response comparisons after adjusting the benchmark to begin after
the end of the Great Moderation (1984:I-2007:IV) rather than using the entire post-war sample. We reach the
same qualititative conclusions regarding the deviation from the benchmark for full-sample and ZLB sub-sample
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2.3.3 Model Performance
Finally, we test whether there are appreciable di¤erences in the impulse responses to a shock
to the shadow short rate estimated over the full sample versus the responses to a shock to the
FFR in our benchmark pre-ZLB sample. In order to do this, we construct the Kullback-Leibler
Divergence (KLD) between the posterior distribution of the benchmark VAR parameters and
the posterior distribution of the VAR parameters estimated using the alternative policy in-
struments.13 We can think of the KLD as a type of loss function that measures deviations
between distributions. We take the benchmark, pre-ZLB posterior parameter distributions as
the truth and measure the extent to which the posterior distributions di¤er from this when
using the shadow rate proxies. Ideally, we want to look at the di¤erence in the distributions of
the impulse responses themselves. However, since there is a one-to-one mapping between the
impulse responses functions and the VAR coe¢ cient and covariance matrices, we can use the
output of the Gibbs sampler to analyze the posterior distribution of the parameter estimates
directly.
Table B.2 gives the values of the KLD between the post-war, pre-ZLB benchmark (1960:I-
2007:IV) and the full-sample (1960:I-2013:III) when using the FFR and each of the two shadow
rates. When including both the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods within the sample, the model
in which the FFR is used to represent policy the entire time produces the smallest KLD,
thus showing the smallest deviation from the benchmark. This is in agreement with our
previous results using the full-sample with a majority of non-ZLB data. However, when looking
specically at the ZLB period, the posterior distribution of VAR parameters estimated with the
shadow rate of Krippner (2012) has the smallest KLD, thus exhibiting less variation than the
distributions using the FFR or the shadow rate of Wu & Xia (2014). The results are the same if
we adjust the benchmark to only consider data after the end of the Great Moderation, therefore
estimating the VAR using data from 1984:I-2007:IV to establish our basis for comparison.
responses using the FFR and the shadow rates.
13The Kullback-Leibler Distance is a metric to assess the deviation of one distribution from another. See
Kullback & Leibler (1951) for more details regarding how to construct this distance.
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Again, the KLD produced from the FFR is smaller than those of the other two models for
both the full, post-Great Moderation (1984:I-2013:III) sample. Furthermore, the KLD using
the Krippner (2012) shadow rate is smallest for the ZLB sub-sample. Removing the inuence
of pre-ZLB data in the dataset by excluding the rst 24 years of data allows for the shadow rate
modications at the ZLB to achieve greater success at merging a comprehensive, continuous
representation of policy between these two periods.
We cannot compute the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to the FFR during
the ZLB period alone as the policy instrument did not exhibit meaningful variation over this
time. When at the ZLB, the shadow rate of Krippner (2012) more closely recovers some
of the benchmark macro dynamics of the pre-ZLB period and these are further preserved if
we employ a full dataset over the entire post-war period, including the years at the ZLB.
We have also found that controlling for the size of the Feds balance sheet and signicant
policy announcements regarding alternative policy programs allows for recovering our baseline
dynamics and provides options to researchers seeking to model economies in which the central
bank is constrained by the ZLB. Having these anomalous years of data between extended
episodes of normal economic activity does not seem to prohibit the use of standard VAR
analyses for the e¤ects of monetary policy.
2.3.4 The Bottom Line
The ZLB period poses an interesting dilemma for empirical researchers. At the outset, we
posed a series of questions for the future empirical study of monetary policy, assuming that
the FFR is the policy instrument when normalcy returns. First, how large are the biases in
the estimated IRFs if one uses the FFR for the full sample? When estimating the linear VAR
model over a long time span, inclusive of a period at the ZLB, we nd that it is su¢ cient to
simply use the FFR as the policy instrument. While the results will be slightly biased, the
biases appear to be small. Once the economy lifts-o¤ from the ZLB and returns to normal
conditions, this bias should be mitigated and the majority of non-ZLB data should dominate
the results.
Second, does adding policy dummies and the balance sheet of the Fed mitigate these
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biases? Representing the policy instrument with a combination of measurements of the FFR,
changes in the size of the Feds balance sheet, and indicator variables for signicant policy
events within the VAR over the full post-war period still produces similar, if not larger, biases
to those produced by the model using only the FFR. This exercise requires estimation of
additional parameters associated with policies unique to the ZLB environment and thus may
introduce ine¢ ciencies when using a dataset consisting of predominantly non-ZLB data.
Third, does exchanging either shadow short rate mitigate these biases? We nd that should
one wish to substitute a shadow rate proxy for the policy instrument during the ZLB period,
hoping to maintain consistent model dynamics throughout the time series, one must recognize
that the shadow rate methodology does not achieve a consistent model in all circumstances.
The choice over which shadow rate to incorporate will dictate whether or not accounting for
structural change is required.
Finally, which shadow short rate does a better job at mitigating these biases? Interestingly,
should one attempt to examine particular ZLB periods in isolation, neither the FFR nor the
shadow rate serve as an adequate representation of policy and do not produce the expected
relationship between e¤ective monetary policy and macroeconomic uctuations. Therefore,
modeling this unique period requires further adjustments and a linear model may not su¢ ce.
2.4 Conclusions
Researchers attempting to measure the e¤ects of monetary policy during the nancial crisis
and subsequent recession beginning in 2008 have encountered di¢ culties when trying to use
the FFR which essentially atlines at zero for much of the period under consideration. We
have proposed using the shadow rate as a measurement of policy which is able to uctuate to
negative values when the e¤ective central bank policy rate faces a binding constraint at zero.
Our results suggest that the shadow rate acts as a good proxy for monetary policy throughout
the ZLB environment only if using a dataset that spans the pre-ZLB period throughout the
ZLB environment. However, the shadow rate is and insu¢ cient proxy for a comprehensive
measurement of monetary policy when examining the ZLB period in isolation.
Examining the FFR alone may suggest that policy has become inactive or ine¤ective but
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the monetary authority has indeed been successful at implementing expansionary policy albeit
through alternative mechanisms. An important point to note is that the economy has witnessed
a break in the instrument used to enact policy but not a break in the e¤ects of monetary
policy on the macroeconomy. Economic researchers use the FFR as a measurement of the
policy instrument for the post-WWII era even though the Fed targeted non-borrowed reserves
from 1979-1982 and borrowed reserves from late 1982 through the mid-1980s. It did not stop
targeting M1 until 1987 and M2 until 1993 and began announcing formal targets for the FFR
only in 1994. Similarly to that change in the behavior of central bankers, the ZLB period
beginning in December 2008 has rendered the traditional policy tool impotent for stimulating
economic activity. The Fed has successfully utilized balance sheet items as instruments and
introduced a much more expansive period of alternative policy measures than the time spent
targeting non-borrowed/borrowed reserves. In order to accurately represent monetary policy
during this period, we need a surrogate measurement such as the shadow rate.
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CHAPTER 3 MONETARY POLICY AND MACRO FACTORS AT THE ZLB
3.1 Introduction
The impaired functioning of nancial markets, leading to the nancial crisis and recession of
2008 and 2009, triggered substantial policy action in major economies around the world. For
the rst time since the Great Depression, U.S. interest rates faced the binding constraint of
the zero lower bound (ZLB), stiing the e¢ cacy of e¤orts of the Federal Reserve to stimulate
economic activity using its standard policy instrument. This forced the adoption of alternative
monetary policy instruments to combat the recession. The Fed broadened its lender-of-last
resort policies, implemented multiple rounds of quantitative easing and used carefully selected
language as forward guidance in its FOMC statements to steer market expectations.
The FOMC policy rate has been pegged e¤ectively at zero since December 2008. Short-
term nominal interest rates have traditionally been considered an indicator of the stance of
monetary policy - looser policy coincides with lower interest rates. However, when interest rates
face a binding constraint at zero, the true policy stance becomes obscured. Tallman & Zaman
(2012) highlight that most Taylor-type rules for monetary policy would have recommended a
negative policy rate starting in 2009 through 2012. This suggests that since the nominal FFR
could not fall below zero, policymakers faced substantial constraints regarding the deviation of
the desired path of the policy rate from that which was feasible. Bernanke & Reinhart (2004)
discuss various strategies for stimulating an economy facing the ZLB. In order to mitigate
this restriction, the Fed began targeting lower long-term interest rates through purchases of
longer-term securities with quantitative easing (QE1 and QE2) and the Maturities Extension
Program (Operation Twist).1 Such unconventional policy measures can ease the perceived
1See Wright (2011), Bauer (2011), Gagnon et al. (2011a), Neely (2013), and Swanson & Williams (2013) for
stance of policy but we then need a di¤erent mechanism to describe the overall level of policy
accommodation.2
In this paper, I describe the joint dynamics of monetary policy, bond yields, and macro-
economic variables, while explicitly modeling the ZLB. Many researchers work from the as-
sumption that the Fed uses the FFR as its primary instrument to set policy in response to
uctuations of real output and ination. When the policy rate is constrained near zero, the
Fed still must act to provide stimulus upon observing stagnant or contractionary economic ac-
tivity. One of the Feds stated objectives in conducting unconventional monetary policy is to
a¤ect interest rates for longer maturity assets. This suggests there could be some explanatory
value gleaned from examining the overall term structure to construct a measurement of the
stance of policy during the ZLB period. Unfortunately, most models of the term structure do
not constrain the short rate to be positive and would have suggested negative short-term rates
throughout the crisis. Many researchers have contributed to the literature on term structure
models that respect the ZLB constraint. Some contemporary approaches include applying a
quadratic term structure model or a model with square-root (CIR) processes.3 More recently,
Monfort et al. (2014) use the autoregressive gamma process to establish a strictly positive
probability of zero interest rates.
Alternatively, Black (1995) established the shadow rate approach and proposed a solution
by introducing the idea of interest rates as options, modifying the typical GATSM to eliminate
the occurrence of negative interest rates. In doing so, Black considered a hypothetical instan-
taneous shadow interest rate which is free to take on negative values. As a result, any time
the shadow interest rate takes on negative values we censor those at zero and establish the
event-study analyses of the e¤ects of FOMC announcments and unconventional policies on nancial markets.
2Francis et al. (2014) propose controlling for the size of the Feds balance sheet and information on alternative
policy announcements in a standard monetary policy vector autoregression (VAR) to represent policy action
during the ZLB period from 2008:I through 2012:IV. They nd that this distorts the impulse responses of key
macroeconomic indicators to policy shocks and thus may be an ine¢ cient approach for future empirical work
once we return to a normal, non-ZLB environment and these policies are no longer in use.
3See Ahn et al. (2002), Leippold & Wu (2002), Cox et al. (1985), Dai & Singleton (2000), and Pearson &
Sun (1994).
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binding constraint observed in nancial markets.4 Bullard (2012) and Bullard (2013) recom-
mend using the shadow rate to represent the stance of policy and highlight how this approach
can shed some light on whether the Feds alternative policies achieved their desired levels of
stimulus. This makes it possible to examine the e¤ects of monetary policy in an environment
which solves the ZLB issue.
Various authors have extended the ideas of Black (1995) and Gorovoi & Linetsky (2004)
by modeling the shadow short rate as an a¢ ne function of a set of factors to incorporate the
ZLB into a dynamic term structure model in a simple and tractable way. Krippner (2012)
modies the Black (1995) framework by calculating the value of a call option to hold cash and
generates closed-form solutions for bond prices and yields. Krippner (2013b) applies the same
basic methodology to U.S. data on the longer end of the term structure. Alternatively, Kripp-
ner (2013a) applies the model to Japanese data. Christensen & Rudebusch (2013) estimate
the rst three-factor shadow rate model using the approach of Krippner (2012) and data on
Japanese government bond yields. Rather than describing yields directly, Wu & Xia (2013)
construct an analytical approximation of ZLB forward rates in discrete time. This allows for a
more straightforward estimation approach than the others methodologies. Alternatively, Lom-
bardi & Zhu (2014) construct a new shadow rate using a dynamic factor model to summarize
the information contained in a comprehensive dataset including variables that reect most
monetary policy actions.
I build upon the foundation established in Krippner (2012), Krippner (2013b), Christensen
& Rudebusch (2013), and Wu & Xia (2014) which use only data on interest rates to extract
the shadow rate.5 Contemporary research on interest rate dynamics recognizes the impor-
tance of accounting for the role played by macroeconomic indicators and monetary policy in
4Gorovoi & Linetsky (2004), Ichiue & Ueno (2007), and Kim & Singleton (2012) apply the Black (1995)
framework to Japanese yield data. Ichiue & Ueno (2013) extend the analysis to include data from Japan, the
U.S., and the U.K. during prolonged ZLB environments.
5Francis et al. (2014) try using the Krippner (2012) and Wu & Xia (2014) shadow rates as measurements of
policy during the ZLB period associated with the Great Recession. The results suggest that while the shadow
rates can be a good proxy for monetary policy within a sample spanning both non-ZLB and ZLB environments,
they may be insu¢ cient for preserving the expected responses of macro variables to policy during this time.
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inuencing nancial markets.6 In most industrialized countries, it appears that the monetary
authority can move the short end of the yield curve, and yields of all maturities respond to
unanticipated changes in the policy rate.7 Additionally, longer-term interest rates seem linked
to aggregate demand and economic output. Many term structure models adopt latent factors
to explain yield curve uctuations, some making an e¤ort to interpret the factors but rarely
in terms of how they compare to macroeconomic factors. Some empirical applications use
the vector autoregression (VAR) framework establish a direct link between interest rates and
macroeconomic variables and taking this into account would likely add value to studies of the
yield curve (see Christiano et al. (1996) and [1999] for a survey). Many of the previous shadow
rate applications do not preserve the empirical connections between monetary policy and the
macroeconomy.
Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) are the rst to include macroeconomic factors within the shadow
rate model. The authors apply the basic specication of Black (1995) to replace the a¢ ne short
rate, censored at zero, with the shadow rate. Bond prices are dened based upon the expected
future path of the nominal short rate, which is determined by the expected probabilities of
negative future shadow rates. Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) apply the econometric methods
of Joslin et al. (2011) to describe uctuations in the yield data using linear combinations of
observed interest rates and data on macro aggregates. Their purpose is not to describe the
stance of monetary policy as they are of the belief that the shadow rate does not give an
accurate depiction of the current policy stance.8 Rather, they use the model to get an idea of
how restrictive is the ZLB and when markets anticipate a lift-o¤ from the ZLB.
In this paper, the goal is to generate a unied representation of the stance of policy during
the ZLB episode, incorporating the inuences of unconventional policy instruments. Through-
out the ZLB environment, we observe uctuations in macro aggregates and thus use the nature
6See Piazzesi (2001), Ang & Piazzesi (2003), Ang et al. (2007), and De Pooter et al. (2010) for various
applications describing the dynamics of the macroeconomy within the a¢ ne term structure methodology.
7See Fleming & Remolona (1999), Gurkaynak et al. (2005), and Staker (2009).
8Bernanke et al. (2004) caution against directly interpreting short-term interest rates as representative of the
current stance of monetary policy. A given policy rate may be associated with many di¤erent congurations
of asset prices and returns.
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of their behavior, in addition to the nancial data, to get a more comprehensive picture of the
true stance of policy. Analyzing the path of the shadow rate allows for tracing out uctuations
in the short end of the yield curve corresponding to unconventional policy stimulus. This
provides some insight into whether these alternative programs continued to ease the stance of
policy once the FFR hit the ZLB.
I apply the general framework introduced in Bauer & Rudebusch (2013), but I incorporate
the macro data in two di¤erent ways. First, like the Macro-Finance model of Bauer & Rude-
busch (2013), I use the macro data as explanatory factors to directly inuence the path of the
shadow rate. I adopt a specication for the policy rate in which the central bank reacts to the
current state of the economy and incorporate a latent factor to capture unobserved shocks to
policy. By describing the shadow rate using a simple interest rate reaction function, I establish
an easily interpretable relationship between observable macro and latent factors and the policy
rate. Policymakers can thus use the model-implied path of the shadow rate as a metric to test
the e¤ectiveness of unconventional policies once the FFR hits zero. The empirical exercise here
di¤ers from that of Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) in that I consider uctuations in the shadow
rate to be representative of uctuations in the stance of policy and examine the systematic
and unsystematic components underlying its dynamics. Secondly, my next innovation involves
shutting down one direction of the endogeneity between macro factors and the shadow rate
where the macroeconomy simply responds to the policy rate and there is no direct feedback
mechanism from macro uctuations into policy. Here, I build a shadow short-rate-augmented
VAR in which the macro aggregates can respond to policy uctuations, but do not feed back
into the term structure. The macro dynamics provide additional information to more accu-
rately extract the path of the shadow rate. Finally, I perform a similar exercise to the other
existing shadow rate methodologies and estimate the model excluding the macro data. I use
Bayesian Markov-Chain Monte Carlo estimation techniques to obtain the model parameters.
I nd that the estimated path of the shadow rate suggests that the Feds unconventional
instruments achieved accommodative policy e¤ects, despite the FFR being near zero for such
an extended time. Models of the term structure that only use data on interest rates, excluding
macro data, suggest a shadow short rate that stays much closer to the ZLB. Incorporating
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macro data through a factor-augmented monetary VAR framework instead allows for predicting
uctuations in medium- and longer-term yields with greater accuracy.9 Furthermore, using
reaction functions to utilize the macro data in constructing the shadow rate generates a proxy
for the stance of policy that suggests the unconventional policy programs achieved a substantial
accommodation, in excess of that prescribed by a standard policy rule.
Finally, I assess how market expectations of future policy rates changed with the intro-
duction of various unconventional instruments. I look at how this expected duration changed
throughout the nancial crisis and through the rst quarter of 2014. Incorporating macro-
economic data into the model of the yield curve produces expectations of the future short
rate being constrained by the ZLB into 2015 if the macro data simply respond to the shadow
rate, or into 2016 if macro factors inuence yield curve dynamics. These expectations are in
agreement with the Feds policy commitments suggested by the use of forward guidance in
FOMC statements.
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the empirical model.
Section 3.3 describes the data and Section 3.4 describes the estimation methods. Section 3.5
presents the results of the estimated shadow rates. Section 3.6 analyzes the systematic and
shock components of the policy rule underlying the Macro-Finance shadow rate. Section 3.7
describes simulation exercises to assess future expectations of the stance of policy. Section 3.8
concludes.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
Standard macro models for the post-war period in the U.S. usually include the e¤ective FFR
as the policy instrument. Take, for example, the monetary vector autoregression (VAR). Let
Zt represent the macro variables of interest, Rt represent the FFR, and dene Yt = [Zt; Rt]
0:
Yt+1 = A (L)Yt + "t+1; (3.1)
9See Stock & Watson (2005) and Bernanke et al. (2005) for a thorough discussion of the factor augmented
VAR (FAVAR) methodology.
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where A (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator and "t  N (0;). The monetary shock is
identied by assuming that FFR can react to shocks to macro variables but the macro variables
cannot contemporaneously react to shocks to the FFR.
At the ZLB, the shadow short rate represents the e¤ective policy rate when all we observe
is a censored version of the nominal rate. The nominal short rate Rt can be expressed as the
maximum of the shadow short rate and zero:
Rt = max frt; 0g : (3.2)
Based upon this approach, the shadow term structure describes the dynamics of interest rates
and bond prices in a realistic way, accounting for the impossibility of negative returns on
nominal bonds of all maturities. The general multi-factor GATSM specication describes the
shadow short rate as a linear function of an N -dimensional state vector [Dai & Singleton
(2000); Du¢ e & Kan (1996)]:
rt = a0 + b
0
0xt; (3.3)
where a0 is a constant, b0 an N  1 vector of coe¢ cients, and xt is the N  1 vector of latent
and/or observable state variables driving the dynamics of the yield curve.10
3.2.1 Central Bank Policy Rate and Observable Macroeconomic Indicators
Krippner (2012) and Christensen & Rudebusch (2013) construct the shadow rate by extract-
ing information from nancial market data only. All elements of xt are unobserved factors
describing uctuations in the term structure.11 Wu & Xia (2014) also construct the shadow
rate using only data on interest rates and then include this in a FAVAR with other macro
10Piazzesi (2010) reviews the literature on a¢ ne term structure methodologies.
11Their methods produce closed-form expressions for bond prices and yields in the ZLB environment but are
not easy to apply with observable macro factors. Incorporating macro data as state variables requires allowing
the states to depend upon not only their own rst lags, but also the lags of the other states. This VAR
interdependence is not possible in the construction of shadow option pricing as described by Chen (1995) and
implemented in Krippner (2012).
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variables to represent policy e¤ects.12 That exercise builds rt as completely exogenous to the
macro framework and then inserts this series into the VAR, assuming it is a comprehensive
representation of the policy instrument. The shadow rate model alone produces a time series
for rt where what we observe, Rt, is censored at zero should rt take on negative values. This
rt describes nancial conditions but omits the the e¤ects of monetary policy and the feedback
between macro dynamics and policy behavior. I incorporate data on real activity and ination
to establish a direct relationship between the macroeconomy, monetary policy, and nancial
markets. Therefore, the dynamics of rt are not exogenous to the macro model.
This endogeneity between the shadow rate mechanism and the macro model can be seen
by rst illustrating the state-space system, within which one can construct the unobserved
shadow rate based on observable macro uctuations. The state transition equation describes
the evolution of the N -dimensional state vector xt:
xt = +  (L)xt 1 + et ; (3.4)
where  (L) is a lag polynomial of order p and et  N (0;). One can partition the observable
dynamics into blocks: one describing the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and
the policy stance in a standard monetary VAR framework, and the second allowing the term
structure dynamics to feed into measures of ination and real activity through the short-term
policy rate, rt, which is a function of xt according to equation (3:3). It will facilitate exposition
to partition the VAR expression from (3:1) above into these blocks. One can rewrite this as a
FAVAR:
264 Zt+1
rt+1
375 =
264 AZ (L) ArZ (L)
AZr (L) Ar (L)
375
264 Zt
rt
375+
264 uZt+1
urt+1
375 ; (3.5)
where AZ (L) represents the e¤ects of changes in the lagged macro variables on each other,
ArZ (L) represents the e¤ects of policy on the macro variables, AZr (L) represents the feedback
from macro variables to policy, and Ar (L) represents the possible persistence in policy.
12Francis et al. (2014) perform a similar exercise using the shadow rate of Krippner (2012) in a FAVAR.
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The third block of the observable dynamics includes the term structure relationships be-
tween observed nominal interest rates, explicitly censored at zero, and the vector of factors
xt. See Section A.1 in the Technical Appendix for a detailed discussion of the GATSM model.
I account for the ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates using the methodology discussed
in Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) in which expectations of future nominal short rates are based
upon the probability that the shadow rate will stay above zero. Assuming that the shadow
rate follows a normal distribution, the observed short rate follows a truncated distribution,
bounded below at zero. Bond prices, and their corresponding interest rates, along the term
structure are based upon expectation of future short rates. Section A.2 of the Technical Ap-
pendix discusses the details of the Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) shadow rate methodology in
detail. In constructing these expectations, one must impose the lower bound by accounting
for the probability that the shadow rate may be negative:
E (Rt+h j Xt) = P (rt+h > 0) E (rt+h j Xt; rt+h > 0) + P (rt+h < 0) 0; (3.6)
where the nal term on the right-hand side illustrates how when the shadow rate is negative,
we see the observed nominal rate censored at zero.
Each month, indexed by t, measurements of observable interest rates Rt become available
for K di¤erent times to maturity. The nominal rates observed in nancial markets are related
to the state vector through the following equation, where cRt is the estimate of equation (A:22)
in the appendix:
266664
R1t
...
RKt
377775 =
266664
dR1t
...dRKt
377775+
266664
v1t
...
vKt
377775
Rt = bRt + vt (3.7)
I assume that all nominal rates are predicted with error and that the innovations vjt for
j = 1; :::;K are normally distributed with mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix: R.
Absence of cross-correlations between the innovations to interest rates of di¤erent maturities
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allows for the model to capture any systematic relationship in movements along the term
structure and any measurement errors outside of that are independent from one another across
di¤erent  and across time.
Combining these blocks, the complete measurement equation becomes:
266664
Zt+1
rt+1
Rt
377775 = ~A
266664
Zt
rtbRt
377775+
266664
uZt+1
urt+1
vt
377775 ; (3.8)
where ~A collects the appropriate coe¢ cient matrices.
The standard approach to estimating such a state-space system is to apply Kalman lter-
ing techniques with a prediction and updating step where the estimate of the unobservable
states is updated by observable information that occurs within the state-space. This simple
exercise incorporates additional information on observable macro dynamics when constructing
the model-implied path of the shadow rate, and provides a solid foundation for interpreting
the shadow rate as the stance of policy.
I estimate three di¤erent versions of this model, di¤erentiated by the extent to which I allow
the macro data to inuence the construction of rt. First, I incorporate macro uctuations as
factors which directly inuence the shadow short-term rate. In this model, xt includes both
observable macro factors and a latent factor. I refer to this as the "Macro-Finance Model".
Secondly, I allow the macro variables to be functions of their own lags, lags of the other
macro variable, as well as the lagged shadow policy rate. The shadow short rate, however, is
dened analogously to previous exercises as only a function of latent factors. This amounts to
restricting the coe¢ cient matrix AZr (L) to all zeros. I refer to this as the "Macro-Monetary
Model". Finally, for comparison to earlier shadow rate applications, I exclude the macro data
completely and estimate the model using only data on interest rates. Here, I exclude the Zt
and rt blocks from the observation equation. I refer to this as the "Finance Model".
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3.2.2 Macro-Finance Model
The Fed sets monetary policy in response to the current state of the economy and makes ad-
justments according to changes in ination and real activity. Since the end of 2008, when the
Fed embarked on the initial series of large-scale asset purchases (QE1), FOMC statements have
explicitly recognized the second pillar of the dual mandate in terms of a maximum employment
objective, abandoning the equivocal reference to economic growth. While pointedly monitor-
ing inationary pressures, the FOMC has also emphasized the importance of labor market
conditions in assessing overall economic slack and the necessity for policy accommodation. As
a result, future policy action has been tied to economic conditions, specically related to the
level of the unemployment rate. Like Ang & Piazzesi (2003), I incorporate macroeconomic
uctuations through data on the unemployment gap and ination as factors which directly
inuence the shadow short-term rate and in turn explain movements in the yield curve. In
addition to this, I allow the shadow policy rate to depend on a latent state variable (f) cap-
turing transient movements of the yield curve not explained by observable macroeconomic
factors. One can interpret this latent factor as an unobservable shock to monetary policy.
This will a¤ect yield spreads and portray how business cycle uctuations a¤ect investorsat-
titudes about pricing bonds as well as gauge the tightness of monetary policy. The short-term
interest rate is a function of both observable macro data and this unobservable factor. Letting
xt = [yt; t; ft ]
0, rt is dened as:
rt = a0 + b
0
0xt (3.9)
= a0 + byyt + bt + bxft:
I normalize bx = 1 since the latent factor can be arbitrarily scaled. Therefore, one can rewrite
the policy rule as:
rt = a0 + byyt + bt + ft: (3.10)
I describe rt in this way in order to achieve greater exibility in how interest rates respond
to the factors in the model and introduce richer dynamics in the relationship between macro
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indicators and nancial market uctuations.
I include the macro data directly in the factor transition equation and describe the joint
dynamics of yt, t, and ft over time by allowing for correlation in the innovations to each
macro data series and the latent factor. Using monthly data, I include 12 lags of the macro
variables and only one lag of the latent factor for parsimony:
266664
yt
t
ft
377775 =
266664
y

f
377775+ 1
266664
yt 1
t 1
ft 1
377775+ 2
264 yt 2
t 2
375+ :::+ 12
264 yt 12
t 12
375+
266664
eyt
et
eft
377775
xt = +  (L)xt 1 + et: (3.11)
The error terms can possibly be correlated:
et =
266664
eyt
et
eft
377775  N (0;) : (3.12)
Since the macro data are included directly in the transition equation, the measurement
equation includes only the term structure relationship between Rt and xt, dened in Section
A.2 of the Technical Appendix:
Rt = bRt + vt: (3.13)
3.2.3 Macro-Monetary Model
In the Macro-Monetary VAR model, I restrict the observable dynamics to describe the shadow
rate as only a function of latent factors, prohibiting the macro factors from directly feeding back
into the state-transition equation. Instead, the term structure dynamics feed into measures of
ination and real activity through the short-term policy rate. I construct the shadow short
rate to represent the true stance of monetary policy and allow this to propagate through the
VAR. When modeling the joint dynamics of yt and t over time, I allow each macro variable
to be a function of its own lags, lags of the other macro variable, as well as the lagged shadow
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policy rate. Following traditional monetary policy applications, the policy rate does not have
a contemporaneous e¤ect on ination and real output. The shadow short rate, serving as a
proxy for the true stance of monetary policy, is the sum of three latent yield curve factors and
the long-run mean short rate level, a0:
rt = a0 + f1t + f2t + f3t: (3.14)
Here, let xt = [f1t; f2t; f3t]
0. The three factor structure is often used to construct a par-
simonious model while still accounting for varied e¤ects on di¤erent components of the yield
curve. This state vector evolves according to a similar transition equation as that described by
(3:11), except that I only include one lag of xt (p = 1). For identication, I adopt the canonical
form of Dai & Singleton (2002) and assume that  is a lower-diagonal coe¢ cient matrix,  is
diagonal, and each factor is mean zero under the physical measure,  = [0; 0; 0]0:
xt = + xt 1 + et ; et  N (0;) : (3.15)
Dene the vector of observed macro variables as Zt = [yt; t]
0. Macroeconomic uctuations
are modeled by the following system:
264 Zt+1
rt+1
375 =
264 AZ (L) ArZ (L)
0 Ar (L)
375
264 Zt
rt
375+ M
264 uZt+1
urt+1
375 ; (3.16)
where uZt = [u
y
t ; u

t ]
0, uyand uare i.i.d. N (0; 1), and M is lower triangular. I include rt in
the VAR as it inuences the macro variables in the subsequent period, but the macro variables
do not inuence rt, AZr (L) = 0. Since the vector xt is a function of its rst lag, and rt is
simply a linear function of xt, rt can be described as a function of its own rst lag. Therefore,
the term urt+1 incorporates the innovations from the factor transition equation, et, and A
r (L)
picks up the autoregressive nature of xt. The coe¢ cient matrices AZ (L) and ArZ (L) are lag
polynomials with 12 lags of each macroeconomic indicator and/or policy rate. In this way,
real activity and ination respond to lagged uctuations in the term structure through their
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responses to the perceived policy rate. Allowing feedback from the latent nancial factors into
the macroeconomy makes this a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) that can be estimated within
the same state-space as the term structure relationships. For these purposes, I am interested
in the response of the macro variables to the shadow rate, rather than to each individual
factor itself. Adding this dimension introduces feedback from the macroeconomy, through the
measurement errors, when extracting the shadow rate from nancial data. In this way, the
model incorporates how overall macro dynamics respond to the stance of policy. Even when
the observed nominal FFR is constrained at zero, uctuations in the shadow rate can explain
uctuations in macro dynamics resulting from the various stimulus programs introduced by
the Fed throughout the Great Recession.
In addition to (3:16), the observation equation of the Macro-Monetary VAR model includes
Rt. Collecting the appropriate coe¢ cient matrices into ~A, the observation equation takes the
following form:
266664
Zt+1
rt+1
Rt
377775 =
266664
AZ (L) ArZ (L) 0
0 Ar (L) 0
0 0 IK
377775
266664
Zt
rtbRt
377775+
266664
uZt+1
urt+1
vt
377775 ; (3.17)
= ~A
266664
Zt
rtbRt
377775+
266664
uZt+1
urt+1
vt
:
377775 (3.18)
3.2.4 Finance Model
Finally, I also construct the shadow rate using only nancial data and include three latent
factors. The shadow rate is described by equation (3:14) and the latent states evolve according
to equation (3:15). The di¤erence between this and the Macro-Monetary Model is that the
observation equation now only includes the term structure relationship between Rt and xt =
[f1t; f2t; f3t]
0, dened in Section A.2 of the Technical Appendix.
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3.2.5 State-Space Representation
The nonlinear state space of the shadow rate model consists of a discrete time estimation prob-
lem in which the state variables evolve according to the system transition equations described
by the previous three sections. Depending on the model specication, the observation equa-
tions place certain restrictions on the components of the coe¢ cient matrix ~A. The remaining
details required for application of the Kalman Filter with all three models are discussed in
Section A.1.1 of the Technical Appendix.
3.3 Data
The interest rate data includes end-of month observations on 3- and 6-month U.S. Treasury
bill rates (from the FRED database on the St. Louis Reserve website) and 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and
5-year smoothed zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bond rates as developed in the data set used for
Gurkaynak et al. (2006) (from the Federal Reserve Board Research Data website). The data
span the period from 01/1985-03/2014. I start the dataset in 1985 in order to ensure the data
come from a period of relatively stable monetary policy. In order to interpret the short-term
interest rate as the main policy tool, it is appropriate to exclude the period in the late 1970s
and early 1980s during which the Fed targeted non-borrowed reserves. I utilize a two-step
estimation procedure. For the rst step, I estimate the model parameters using the data from
01/1985-12/2007, before the depth of the nancial crisis and the onset of the ZLB environment.
Then using these parameter values, I lter the states using the extended Kalman lter (EKF)
through the nonlinear state space.
Figure B.6 plots the monthly time series of macro data from 01/1985-03/2014. To measure
real economic activity, I construct the unemployment gap by taking the di¤erence between
the unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Congressional
Budget O¢ ce estimate of the natural rate of unemployment. Negative values correspond
to a contemporaneous unemployment rate larger than the natural rate and thus represent
contractionary economic conditions. To measure ination, I calculate the annual log di¤erence
in the consumer price index for all urban consumers, excluding food and energy (core CPI):
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log (yt)   log (yt 12). All price data are obtained from the St. Louis FRED database. Like
Bauer & Rudebusch (2013), I use measurements of ination and the unemployment gap as
they have been found to be closely linked to the Feds target for the FFR.13 The observations
cover the same time period as the interest rate data. I convert the interest rate data into yields
per month and therefore divide the macro data by 12 in order to represent all data in monthly
terms. Finally, I demean the macro data and impose that the monetary policy shock is mean
zero in order to omit the intercept term from the state transition equation:  is a vector of
zeros.
3.4 Estimation
As mentioned previously, I adopt a two-step method by rst estimating the model parameters
from the standard linear state space model under conditions where the ZLB doesnt bind
(01/1985-12/2007, prior to the nancial crisis and Great Recession). I apply an iterative
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to lter the state vector, conditional
on the model parameters, for the period in which all nominal interest rates are observed.14
Then conditioning on the ltered state values, I estimate the model parameters with Gibbs
sampling or Metropolis-Hastings steps, depending on if the model generates a closed-form
posterior distribution [Carter & Kohn (1994); Casella & George (1992)]. I repeat this procedure
until convergence and consider the parameter values generated from this algorithm to be
appropriate for empirical analysis of the remaining ZLB period. I set di¤use prior hyper-
parameters and initialize the Gibbs sampling paths based on OLS estimates of macro dynamics
with the observed FFR as the short-term interest rate. To include macroeconomic dynamics
in the measurement equation of the Macro-Monetary model, I estimate a Bayesian VAR of
the unemployment gap and ination which both respond to lagged uctuations in the shadow
rate. See Appendix Section A.3 for a description of the MCMC application and Table B.3 for
details on the prior parameterization.
13See Rudebusch (2009).
14Sanford & Martin (2005), Blais (2009), Bauer (2012), Ang et al. (2007), and Chib & Ergashev (2008) also
adopt Bayesian methods to estimate dynamic term structure models.
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The second step involves making the assumption that the model parameters do not change
once nominal rates hit the ZLB. When this occurs, the shadow rate may fall below zero but
the fundamental model dynamics are preserved. Krippner (2012) and Bauer & Rudebusch
(2013) also take this approach, and estimate the a¢ ne model prior to the onset of the ZLB
environment. In the appendix, Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) justify using the a¢ ne model
parameters for the shadow rate model by comparing model-implied yields over the pre-2008
period within each model framework. Using the same set of parameter values, the root mean
squared errors from the a¢ ne and shadow rate models are very similar and thus the cross-
sectional t is almost identical. This suggests that parameter instability in the fundamental
term structure relationships does not seem to be an issue. Under this assumption, I estimate
the latent state vector using the EKF to propagate the states forward through the ZLB period.
See Section A.4 in the Appendix for a brief overview of the steps involved in the EKF.
3.5 Shadow Rate Estimation Results
3.5.1 Macro-Finance Model
Figure B.7 shows the e¤ective FFR and all three ltered shadow rates from 01/2006-03/2014,
beginning prior to the nancial crisis and capturing the descent towards the ZLB. The red line
traces out the model-implied time series for the Macro-Finance shadow rate. For the earlier
period in which the ZLB did not present a binding constraint, the path of the shadow rate
followed that of the FFR and di¤erences from the e¤ective policy rate are due to measurement
error resulting from the ltering application. The shadow rate crossed zero between 10/2008
and 11/2008, around the same time that the FFR hit the ZLB. Right around the announcement
of QE2 in 11/2010, the shadow rate reached a local minimum and spiked afterwards. The
reaction function for the short rate suggests the interpretation that the announcement of QE2
had expansionary e¤ects by stimulating ination and real activity, thus increasing the short
rate. While still signicantly below zero, the shadow rate declines at a lesser rate throughout
the implementation of MEP (09/2011) and QE3 (09/2012) and does not fall as steeply as
during the previous period. The shadow rate reached its lowest value of  8:81% in 07/2012,
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leading up to the start of QE3 and prior to the extension of the Feds forward guidance in
the FOMC statement later that year (12/2012) in which the committee promised to keep
interest rates low, and near zero, until economic conditions improve. After QE3, the shadow
rate steadily increased through the end of the sample. As a result of the construction of the
policy reaction function, this is representative of improved economic conditions in response to
extensive policy stimulus. By the end of the sample in 07/2013, the shadow rate remained
negative at  2:99%. This suggests the short end of the yield curve was still substantially
constrained by the ZLB.
3.5.2 Macro-Monetary Model
The blue line of Figure B.7 plots the ltered time series for the Macro-Monetary shadow rate.
This shadow rate did not fall completely to zero when the FFR hit the ZLB. Rather, the
shadow rate did not cross the zero threshold until 11/2009 and stayed between  0:31% and
0:75% throughout the nancial crisis and the Great Recession, rarely dipping below zero. This
ltering exercise nds that the shadow rate was only slightly negative by the end of the sample
in 03/2014 at  0:11%.
Inference from this model suggests that real activity and ination react to a policy mea-
surement which more resembles the observed stance of policy, as represented by the nominal
FFR. The e¤ective FFR obviously remained positive throughout the entire period, facing the
barrier at zero. Filtering the shadow rate through the monetary VAR in the measurement
equation implies a near zero, yet still mostly positive value for the policy rate propagating
through the VAR mechanism. This may help explain why the empirical exercises of Francis
et al. (2014) nd that using the observed FFR as the measurement of policy, even including
the ZLB environment, still produces results close to the expected impulse responses of overall
economic indicators in the baseline period.
Bauer & Rudebusch (2013), Christensen & Rudebusch (2013), and Krippner (2013b) em-
phasize how shadow short rates are often sensitive to the characteristics of the model used
to construct them, as well as the data and estimation technique. Furthermore, these model-
implied shadow rates are not the e¤ective rates actually faced by agents in the economy making
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investment and consumption decisions. For example, investors are not compensated for bor-
rowing in the case of a negative shadow rate. Macro aggregates respond to the observed policy
rate in that they cannot react to a perceived negative short rate. This would explain why the
Macro-Monetary shadow rate remained mostly positive, but very close to zero, throughout the
period in which the Fed exercised zero interest rate policy. As a result, this specic model
does not require the added exibility of possibly negative short-term rates but rarely violates
the ZLB without necessarily imposing it as a constraint.
3.5.3 Finance Model
The orange line in Figure B.7 shows the estimated time series for the Finance shadow rate from
01/2006-03/2014. In the pre-ZLB environment, the model achieves considerably close t to
the true data. Around the same time when the Fed dropped the target for the FFR essentially
to zero in 12/2008, the shadow rate dropped down near zero and uctuated between 0% and
1:10% until 11/2010 when it fell below zero. The shadow rate reached its lowest value of 1:82%
at the end of the sample in 03/2014, one-and-a-half years after the implementation of QE3.
The 03/19/2014 FOMC statement15 expressed the Feds commitment to maintain its highly
accommodative stance of policy, with low interest rates, and to continuously assess the progress
"towards its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent ination," thus avoiding any
date-based guidance or tying policy action to a specic threshold for unemployment.
The shadow rate appears highly sensitive to the characteristics of the given model used
to construct it. One can compare the three-factor Finance shadow rate with estimates from
Wu & Xia (2014) using the normalizations described by Joslin et al. (2011) to construct an
alternative three-factor shadow rate model also using only yield curve data. Whereas I estimate
the model using Bayesian methods, Wu & Xia (2014) use the maximum likelihood technique
with robust standard errors. The authors splice together the e¤ective FFR time series through
12/2008 with the estimated shadow from 01/2009 onwards and dene this latter period as
the that during which the ZLB binds and the shadow rate methodology becomes relevant. I
15See FOMC (2014).
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do the same with the Finance shadow rate produced here in order to construct comparable
series for the policy rate. Figure B.8 plots the e¤ective FFR and the Wu & Xia (2014)
and the Finance policy rate series from 01/2006 through 03/2014. The model restrictions
and estimation method di¤er but these three-factor models using only nancial data produce
qualitatively similar shadow rate paths over the ZLB period, decreasing and increasing over
virtually the same periods, but the Finance shadow rate shows a level shift above the Wu-Xia
rate. These two models have comparable implications regarding the extent to which the ZLB
represented a signicant constraint from 2008 through 2014.
3.5.4 In-Sample Yield Curve Forecasting
To evaluate the e¤ectiveness in improving model estimates by incorporating the ZLB into the
GATSM, one can assess how well the model captures the cross-sectional behavior of observed
yields along the length of the term structure. Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) suggest the idea that
a su¢ ciently exible shadow rate model should be able to t the cross-section of longer-term
yields without pushing the short-term interest rate far below zero, and far below the values
observed in nancial markets. Models that do not t the data well may then compensate for
the discrepancy by pushing the shadow rate far into negative territory in order to come closer
to matching the medium- and long-term rates. Table B.4 shows the root mean squared-errors
(RMSEs) for all seven yields in the dataset and the spread between the 5-year Treasury bond
and the 3-month T-bill, as implied by each of the three models. For comparison, I compute
the RMSEs between the observed data and model predictions over the pre-ZLB period when
the standard GATSM would apply (01/1985-12/2008), and over the ZLB period when the
modications of the shadow rate model are required (01/2009-03/2014: the end of the sample).
I construct model-implied interest rates using the latent factor(s) ltered using the EKF and
the observed macro factors to compute: cRt =   1 log cP t , where cP t is described by equation
(A:25) in the Technical Appendix. The RMSE values are on annual yields and are expressed
in percentage points.
As the top panel of Table B.4 shows, during the pre-ZLB period the Finance model pro-
duces the smallest RMSEs for the shortest maturity yield in the model. Therefore, the term
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structure dynamics at the short-end are best explained by looking at a panel of nancial data.
However, the Macro-Monetary model improves estimation for medium-term yields and pro-
duces a smaller RMSE for the 6-month T-bill and the 1-, 2-, and 3-year T-bonds. For the
longest maturities and the term spread, the Finance model regains its superior performance.
Including the macro data in a reactionary way allows for more accurately modeling interest
rates over the time span during which lagged policy e¤ects may surface.
For the 3-month through 4-year yields, the Macro-Finance model achieves comparable accu-
racy across maturities but is less accurate than the other two models. For the longest maturity
and the spread, the performance of the Macro-Finance model deteriorates considerably. As-
suming the short-term rate responds directly to observed ination and the unemployment gap,
along with a 12-lag structure of the macro dynamics, may not be the most appropriate way
to incorporate macro data into a term structure model in the typical, non-ZLB environment.
The bottom panel of Table B.4 reports the RMSEs specically for the ZLB period (01/2009-
03/2014). For the shortest maturity, all three models achieve comparable accuracy and pro-
duce RMSEs around 10 basis points. The Macro-Monetary and Finance models maintain
this accuracy out to the 2-year bond, outperforming the Macro-Finance model. Like in the
pre-ZLB period, the accuracy of the Macro-Finance model deteriorates for medium- and long-
term yields, reaching over one percentage point on the 5-year yield. The Macro-Monetary
model performs well at matching the medium-term yields within a ZLB environment, pro-
ducing smaller RMSEs than those from the Finance model on the 2-, 3-, and 4-year bonds.
Finally, for the longer end of the yield curve, the Finance model now slightly outperforms
the Macro-Monetary model, but the two models suggest similar interpretations regarding the
extent of the e¤ects of the ZLB constraint. Moreover, the Macro-Monetary model produces
a substantial reduction in RMSEs when compared with the Macro-Finance model for these
maturities. Incorporating macro uctuations in the model in a reactionary way, through the
monetary VAR, rather than allowing the macro factors to directly inuence the term structure,
generates more accurate predictions of rates for the medium- and long-term. The response of
macro indicators to lagged short rates is informative for discerning expectations about eco-
nomic and nancial uctuations over at least the medium-horizon, thus supporting the notion
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that uctuations in the stance of policy have lagged e¤ects on the macroeconomy.
All three shadow rate models come closer to matching the true yields during the ZLB period
than during the years prior to the nancial crisis. More specically, with the exception of the
2- and 3-year yields from the Finance model, the RMSEs across the entire term structure
are smaller during the ZLB period and particularly for the longer-term yields. Furthermore,
all three models match the spread between the 5-year and 3-month Treasury yields more
accurately during the ZLB period. Allowing for additional exibility within the shadow rate
model produces more accurate model-implied estimates of yields across the term structure,
but this exibility may be distortionary during normal times and impede the predictive ability
of the models.
Furthermore, all three models generate slightly di¤erent implications for the stance of
monetary policy at the ZLB and the projected duration for which the economy will remain
constrained with prohibitively low interest rates. These results motivate the question: does a
closer model t suggest a more accurate representation of the stance of policy and how is this
reconciled with the proposition of Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) suggesting that a shadow rate
closer to the observed short-term interest rate is indicative of greater predictability of the full
term structure. While the FFR anchors the short-end of the yield curve, when it is constrained
by the ZLB, the Macro-Monetary model appears to capture how the constrained short rate
elicits a new focus on targeting rates with longer maturities. Real activity and ination exhibit
stronger responsiveness to the observed FFR while the model picks up the shifted emphasis of
policy towards longer term rates and matches this data more closely. Intuitively, traditional
macro models in the non-ZLB period should match the shorter-end of the yield curve better
as policymakers clearly focus on directly inuencing the FFR. Under these circumstances, the
Finance model produces a better model t. However, once at the ZLB, the policy consensus
shifts towards inuencing medium- and longer-term interest rates. As a result, we need to
change the measurement of the overall stance of policy itself. The Macro-Monetary model
provides a mechanism for capturing this institutional change and produces results comparable
to the Finance model, without requiring the shadow rate to substantially violate the ZLB.
It is inconsistent to think that the short end of the yield curve will be most accurately
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modeled in a ZLB environment when the Fed abandons traditional policy objectives and the
goal shifts towards moving the long end, distorting the slope of the yield curve as the short
end ceased to show substantial variation. As a result, uctuations in real economic activity
and ination may become less important for inuencing the short end of the yield curve.
The intention of policy has been to target long-term rates directly in the face of stagnant
real growth and little risk of ination. Traditional monetary policy is inapplicable under
these circumstances and the Fed has continued expansionary policy e¤orts not by targeting a
new level for the FFR, but rather inuencing investment and consumption decisions through
longer rates. In doing so, the short-term interest rate is less responsive to macro uctuations,
as evidenced by the less accurate model predictions from the Macro-Finance model where
the policy rate responds directly to observed macro data. The Macro-Monetary model, in
which macro aggregates simply respond to uctuations in interest rates, gives a more accurate
description of the break in policy directives at the ZLB.
3.6 Macro-Finance Shadow Rate and Policy Rules
Underlying the shadow rate model is the assumption that the standard macro model doesnt
change once we hit the ZLB. The fundamental relationships between macro aggregates, nan-
cial markets, and monetary policy exhibit the same behavior in the ZLB environment as in
normal times, as long as the correct measurement of monetary policy is used. Previous shadow
rate models that exclude macro data maintain consistent dynamics in nancial markets but
do not address what is going on in the macroeconomy. This paper makes the additional as-
sumption that the consistency applies to macro dynamics, where the shadow rate provides a
comprehensive representation of the stance of monetary policy.
By construction, the Macro-Finance model embeds a policy rule through which the Fed
pursues its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability. Incorporating the un-
employment gap to represent real economic activity aligns the interest rate reaction function
with FOMC statements specically related to forward guidance. While consistently monitor-
ing inationary pressures, policymakers have recently acknowledged the maximum employment
mandate directly. Seeking to guide expectations of future policy action, in particular regarding
46
when the FFR may be lifted away from the ZLB, the Fed mentioned targets for the unemploy-
ment rate beginning in December 2012. Due to the importance of labor market conditions in
determining slack in the overall economy, I dene the policy rule as a function of the di¤erence
between the CBO estimate of the natural rate of unemployment and the observed unemploy-
ment rate, along with the ination rate of core CPI. I extract the systematic component of
the Macro-Finance shadow rate to illustrate what the policy rate should be based on economic
conditions. I decompose the shadow rate expression in equation 3.10 into the policy rule com-
ponent, policyt = a0 + byyt + bt, and the unobserved component, ft. This allows one to
di¤erentiate the policy rule from the latent factor, capturing unexplained shocks to the stance
of policy.
Figure B.9 shows plots of the e¤ective FFR, the Macro-Finance shadow rate, the policy
rule component of the shadow rate (policyt), and the unobserved factor (ft) from 01/2000-
03/2014. Over the period preceding the nancial crisis, the di¤erence between the systematic
policy prescription and both the FFR and the shadow rate suggests that policy was more
accommodative than would have been recommended by a strict rule. Part of this deviation
may be due to less emphasis on unemployment over this earlier time.16 Once hitting the ZLB,
the latent factor falls substantially to incorporate the e¤ects of unconventional policies that did
not necessarily rely on historic policy rules to dictate the appropriate level of accommodation.
Even through the strenuous recovery, the policy rule prescribes much less accommodation
than that depicted by the shadow rate, where the enhanced accommodation is apparent in
the unobserved factor. In setting policy, the Fed was likely reacting to a more diverse set of
economic conditions than simply the unemployment gap.
I focus on the later part of the sample to capture the unique environment surrounding
the ZLB. As shown in Figure B.9, the policy rule recommends a negative rate from mid-2009
through 2011, leading up to QE2 in 11/2010, and even suggests possible tightening from 2012
through 2014. Lombardi & Zhu (2014) reach a similar conclusion with their shadow suggesting
16Lombardi & Zhu (2014) also examine the gap between their model-implied shadow rate and the levels of
the FFR suggested by simple Taylor Rules. They also nd that the stance of policy was too loose between 2001
and 2006.
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a tightening in the stance of policy after 08/2011. Inationary pressures and reductions in
labor market slack support moderating the extent of policy accommodation. Interestingly, the
unobserved factor reaches its lowest values between the implementation of the MEP (09/2011)
and QE3 (09/2012). In comparison to the estimated policy rule, this period represents the
most substantial unconventional policy accommodation.
3.7 What Do Markets Expect?
In addition to past or contemporaneous values of the shadow rate, expectations of future
shadow rates also have important economic implications, especially during times in which
the Fed seeks to inuence expectations of future policy action. I use all three models to
analyze what one can discern about market expectations of future shadow rates and, thus,
the extent to which markets expect the economy remain in a ZLB environment. Taking the
ltered values for each of the factors at the end of the sample, I perform Monte Carlo (MC)
simulations to construct possible paths for these factors using the risk-neutral data generating
process described by equation (A:6) in the Technical Appendix. I utilize the expression from
the model which relates the expectation of the short rate at horizon h to the expectation of
the vector of factors
h
EQt (rt+h) = E
Q
t (a0 + b
0
0Xt+h)
i
and simulate 10; 000 candidate paths
for each factor ve years into the future. At each horizon h, I construct the model-implied
shadow rate and the corresponding short rate
h
EQt (Rt+h) = max
n
EQt (rt+h) ; 0
oi
. Finally,
I look at the distribution of future shadow rates to describe what markets expect regarding
future policy.
Initially, I use the full data sample to construct expectations based on the markets knowl-
edge as of 03=2014. Secondly, I consider the economic environment around the announcements
of two rounds of quantitative easing: QE1 in 11=2008 and QE2 in 11=2010, and the issuance
of two FOMC statements in which the Fed used forward guidance to steer policy expectations.
The rst use of forward guidance that I consider focuses on the 08=2011 FOMC statement
when the Fed promised to keep interest rates low, and near zero, until at least mid-2013. The
second use of forward guidance (12=2012) suggested the FFR target will only be lifted when
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economic conditions improve enough to warrant the increase. I conduct the future simula-
tions both using data up through the month preceding and the month following each of these
policy announcements. The model-implied paths of the shadow rate throughout the era of un-
conventional policy measures exhibit substantial variation, suggesting high sensitivity to the
given model specications. For specic details of the timing and results from these simulation
exercises, see Table B.5.
Figure B.10 plots the projected path of the shadow rate produced by each model speci-
cation over the next ve years, constructed by simulating forward many possible paths of the
macro and/or latent factors beginning in 04=2014. The plot includes both the MC estimate of
the mean as well as the 95% coverage interval over all simulations. By the end of the sample,
all three models suggest a shadow rate representative of continued policy easing with values
still below zero ( 2:99% for the Macro-Finance shadow rate,  0:11 for the Macro-Monetary
shadow rate, and  1:82% for the Finance shadow rate). Basing the simulated forecasts on
the full sample, the expected Macro-Finance and Finance shadow rates remain signicantly
below zero until late-2015 and until late-2014, respectively. Expectations based on the Macro-
Finance model suggest that markets anticipate the ZLB to signicantly constrain the short
end of the yield curve for a considerable time into the future while the ZLB represents a
minimal threat going forward in the Finance model. Interestingly, using expectations based
only on nancial data suggests the ZLB environment is projected to persist for a shorter time
than expectations incorporating macro factors directly. Therefore, the Finance model gives a
description of nancial markets as being relatively less constrained by the ZLB at this point
in the recovery. Alternatively, the expected future path of the Macro-Monetary shadow rate
never falls signicantly below zero within the next ve years. The Macro-Monetary model tries
to capture movements in the longer end of the yield curve without pushing the shadow rate
far below the zero threshold. There is much less support in this model for a negative future
shadow rate and thus incorporating the monetary VAR into the model illustrates how macro
aggregates respond to the observed stance of policy.
While the quantitative nature of the paths di¤er, they exhibit similar qualitative charac-
teristics around the timing of policy announcements. For example, around the announcement
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of QE1, all three models suggest a perceived policy easing with their respective shadow rates
falling between the months before and after the announcement. QE1 appears to have had some
expansionary e¤ects by adjusting market expectations of future short rates downward for at
least the next year. Basing the simulated forecasts on data up through the months preceding
and following the announcement of QE1, only the Macro-Finance shadow rate was expected
to be signicantly below zero after the policy was put in place.
Regarding QE2, both models incorporating macro data suggest a slight tightening of policy
in the months around the announcement. The Macro-Finance and Macro-Monetary shadow
rates increase around the announcement. In contrast, the shadow rate from the Finance model
best captures the impact e¤ect of a perceived policy easing with a decline in the contempora-
neous shadow rate around this time. Forecasts based on data through the announcement of
QE2 also illustrate that market expectations in only the Macro-Finance and Finance models
suggested a signicantly negative path for the shadow rate in future months.
All three models accurately interpreted the rst use of forward guidance in the 08=2011
FOMC statement as a promise for continued policy accommodation. All three shadow rates
fell between the months before and after the release of this statement. Forecasts using data up
through 08=2011 show that markets expected the Macro-Finance and Finance shadow rates
to be signicantly negative in the coming months. Markets may have interpreted this policy
action as a commitment by the central bank to maintain expansionary policy for a considerable
amount of time, despite the fact that traditional interest rate policy couldnt be used e¤ectively.
By the second use of forward guidance in 12=2012, now linking policy action to future economic
conditions, market expectations seem to have stabilized and participants expected easy policy
for a signicant time into the future. The FOMC statement may not have contained any
sort of policy surprise as the model-implied shadow rates changed only very slightly. However,
forecasts based on data through this point in time suggest that markets anticipated signicantly
negative shadow rates based upon the two models including macro data. The 12=2012 FOMC
statement helped to temper future expectations regarding the expected duration of the ZLB
episode and maintain a successfully accommodative policy stance.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I incorporate macroeconomic information into a model of the term structure,
capturing dynamics in the relationship between monetary policy, overall economic conditions,
and nancial markets. The ndings suggest that it is inappropriate to use only the FFR to
represent policy in a monetary policy analysis at the ZLB. The shadow rate model produces
a more comprehensive measurement of monetary policy in a ZLB environment by capturing
how the Fed has changed focus over time by targeting short-, medium-, or long-term interest
rates. Using only interest rate data, the Finance shadow rate stayed fairly close to zero while
the FFR hovered just above zero throughout the Great Recession and its recovery. Includ-
ing macro data produces a description of how the economy responded to the Feds arsenal of
unconventional policies. The Macro-Finance shadow rate dipped below zero in the very early
stages of the nancial crisis and remained substantially below zero through the end of the
sample. A widening unemployment gap and declining ination characterize the persistent eco-
nomic contraction and keep the shadow rate well below zero through the Great Recession and
its subsequent arduous recovery. The Macro-Monetary shadow rate suggests that real activity
and ination react more to the observed stance of policy, as discerned by the nominal e¤ective
FFR. This approach acknowledges the relationship between the macroeconomy and short-term
interest rates, as is usually done in a standard monetary VAR, and stabilizes uctuations in
the shadow rate once the ZLB binds. Utilizing macro data in this manner is more e¤ective at
predicting medium- and longer-term yields than allowing the macro data to feed into the term
structure itself and thus better captures the shift in policy focus to targeting the long end of
the yield curve with unconventional policy programs.
The Fed seemed to have been successful at e¤ectively communicating information about
these programs and guiding future expectations when the well-understood method for setting
policy could no longer be used e¤ectively. With this substantial accommodation, market
expectations of future shadow rates indicate that the economy is believed to stay near the
ZLB for the foreseeable future, in line with the language associated with forward guidance
in FOMC statements. Excluding the macro factors results in an interpretation of a tighter
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stance of policy and the expected lift-o¤ from the ZLB would occur considerably earlier in
future projections.
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APPENDIX A TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A.1 Standard GATSM Methodology
To preserve the functional form of the standard GATSM, I combine all lags of each state
variable in the vector Xt and write the VAR in companion form:
xt = +  (L)xt 1 + et ; (A.1)
where  and  collect the appropriate mean and autocorrelation coe¢ cients. The factor inno-
vation volatilities are normally distributed, et  N (0;), where either 1=2 is lower-triangular
or  is diagonal, depending on the model specication.
I can write the factor dynamics in companion form, stacking all p lags of xt into one vector,
Xt:
Xt =  + Xt 1 + "t; (A.2)
 =
264 
0(N (p 1))1
375 ; (A.3)
"t =
264 et
0(N (p 1))1
375 and  =
264 1=2 0N(N (p 1))
0(N (p 1))N 0(N (p 1))(N (p 1))
375 : (A.4)
The coe¢ cient matrix  collects the lag polynomial coe¢ cients for p lags. Written in this form,
the residual terms in the equations for lagged factors are identically equal to zero.
Typically, authors di¤erentiate between the physical, observed dynamics and risk-neutral
dynamics of the state variables. The risk neutral-dynamics illustrate how a risk-neutral investor
would view the evolution of the factors over time. Assuming an absence of arbitrage implies
the existence of this risk-neutral measure, which is used for pricing assets and determining
yields. I assume time-varying market prices of risk which are linear in the state vector:
 t = 0 + 1Xt: (A.5)
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Under the risk-neutral measure, Xt evolves according to the following expression:
Xt = 
Q + QXt 1 + "Qt ; (A.6)
where
Q =   0; (A.7)
Q =   1: (A.8)
To identify the latent factor, I assume a zero mean under the physical measure ( = 0).
Like Ang et al. (2007), to reduce the number of parameters within the model, I assume that
the constant component of the prices of risk, 0, depends only on current factors:
0 =
264 e0
0(N (p 1))1
375 ; (A.9)
where e0 is of dimension N1. The coe¢ cient on Xt, 1, relates the time-varying components
to the risk prices and places weight on contemporaneous and lagged values of the macro factors
but only on the current value of the latent factor:
1 =
264 e1
0(N (p 1))(N p)
375 ; (A.10)
where e1 has zeros in the columns that correspond to higher lags of xU in the Macro-Finance
model. The VAR dynamics under the risk-neutral measure incorporate uctuations of all state
variables, adjusted for the risk associated with innovations to the factors.
A.1.1 Estimation of Parameters with the Kalman Filter
The standard GATSM specication can be written in state space form, with state variables
driving the shadow short rate. Introducing the extensions in the shadow rate models to account
for episodes in which interest rates reach the ZLB makes the linear state space representation
infeasible. Therefore, I follow Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) and Krippner (2012) by estimating
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the model in linear state space form with data where interest rates do not hover near the ZLB
and then using these parameter values to estimate a system of equations representing interest
rates in the shadow rate framework.
The state transition equations takes on the standard from when writing the VAR for vector
Xt under the physical measure in companion form. Recall, I demean the macro data and impose
that the latent monetary policy shock is mean zero and therefore omit the intercept term:
Xt = Xt 1 + et : (A.11)
Thus the covariance matrix for the transition equation of latent yield curve state variables is
equal to Q = .
The standard GATSM combines interest rates for K di¤erent maturities at time t and
allows for constructing the measurement equation of the linear state space as:
Rt = a+ bXt + vt; (A.12)
where Rt is the K  1 vector of yield curve data, A is the K  1 vector [a1 ; :::; aK ]0, B is the
K  N matrix [b1 ; :::; bK ] and 1; :::; K represent the times to maturity of the yield curve
data. The covariance matrix for the measurement equation takes the form:
R = diag

2v (1) ; :::; 
2
v (K)

; (A.13)
where the diagonality is standard in this literature under the assumption that all other con-
temporaneous and inter-temporal covariances between interest rates of di¤erent maturities are
zero.
A.2 Constructing the Shadow Term Structure
With the shadow policy rate described by equation (3:10) and the nominal policy rate by
equation (3:2), I follow the approach of Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) and focus on the conditional
expectation and variance of future shadow rates, taking as given the time t values of the factors
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(Xt)
1:
ert+h = E (rt+h j Xt) = a0 + b00E (Xt+h j Xt) = a0 + b00 hI   hE (Xt) + hXti ; (A.14)

hr
2
= V ar (rt+h j Xt) = b00V ar (Xt+h j Xt) b0 = b00
 
h 1X
i=0
i0i0
!
b0: (A.15)
Expectations of future nominal short rates are based upon the probability that the shadow
rate will stay above zero. Assuming that the shadow rate follows a normal distribution, the
observed short rate follows a truncated distribution, bounded below at zero. In constructing
expectations of future short rates, I impose the lower bound by accounting for the probability
that the shadow rate may be negative. resulting in the observed rate being censored at zero:
E (Rt+h j Xt) = P (rt+h > 0) E (rt+h j Xt; rt+h > 0) + P (rt+h < 0) 0
= 
ert+h
hr
24ert+h + hr 

 ert+h
hr

1  

 ert+h
hr

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= 
ert+h
hr
ert+h + hr ert+hhr

; (A.16)
where  () is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and  () is the associated
density function.
To constrain a normally distributed random variable, r  N
er; (r)2, to lie within a
specic interval, r 2 (; ), one can consider r to follow a truncated normal distribution. In
the case regarding observed short rates,  = 0 and r is unbounded above ( =1). Since we
only observe Rt = rt if rt > 0, the rst line of (A:16) illustrates that we must consider the
portion of the distribution for the shadow rate when r takes on positive values. The rst term of
the second line gives the probability that the shadow rate is positive: P (rt+h > 0) = 
ert+h
hr

,
1For the Macro-Finance model, Xt includes twelve lags of [yt; t; ft]. For the Finance and Macro-Monetary
models, Xt = [f1t; f2t; f3t].
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where the standard normal CDF is evaluated at
E (rt+h j Xt)
(V ar (rt+h j Xt))0:5
=
ert+h
hr
: (A.17)
The second term of this line uses the one-sided truncated normal distribution to describe the
expectation of the shadow rate, given that it is above zero:
E (rt+h j Xt; rt+h > 0) = E (rt+h j Xt) + hr


 E(rt+h j Xt)
hr

1  

 E(rt+h j Xt)
hr

= ert+h + hr 

 ert+h
hr


ert+h
hr
 ; (A.18)
where the arguments for  () and  () in (A:18) come from the fact that the lower bound
 = 0 and E (rt+h j Xt) = ert+h.
In the standard GATSM, bond prices are exponential a¢ ne functions of the underlying
factors [Xt]. Let P t be the price of a zero-coupon bond at time t with time to maturity  :
P t = exp (A
 +BXt) ; (A.19)
where the coe¢ cients are functions of the state vector autoregressive coe¢ cients, the market
prices of risk of each factor, and the factor volatilities:
A+1 = A +B 0Q +
1
2
B 00B 0   a0; (A.20)
B+10 = B 0Q   b0: (A.21)
The meta parameters like many deep parameters in macro models produce cross-equation
restrictions in the measurement equation of the state space. Bond yields are related to prices
by the following:
Rt =  
1

log (P t ) = a
 + bXt; (A.22)
where a =  A and b =  B

 . Let Rt = [R1t ; :::; RKt ]0 be a K  1 vector of period t
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nominal interest rates for bonds of di¤erent maturities. Since each element of Rt is related to
the state variables by the a¢ ne function (A:22), the observation equation of the state space
system in the standard GATSM takes a linear form:
Rt = a+ bXt + vt; (A.23)
where vit  iidN
 
0; 2v ( i)

, and a and b are vectors of the a and b coe¢ cients for  =
f1; :::;Kg.
However when observed short rates are censored at the ZLB, I instead focus on expectations
of the future path of the shadow rate which in turn guide expectations about the nominal short
rate based upon whether markets expect the shadow rate to stay below zero. For a set of factors
at time t, the bond price can be expressed as an expectation of future nominal short rates:
P t = E
Q
t
"
exp
 
 
 1X
i=0
Rt+i
!#
: (A.24)
The a¢ ne relationship of equation (A:23) deteriorates at the ZLB and (A:24) establishes a
nonlinear relationship between yields and the underlying factors. One cannot describe bond
prices and yields with analytic closed-form expressions once accounting for the probability of
negative rt and censored Rt. Therefore, I adopt the same methodology applied in Bauer &
Rudebusch (2013) and use Monte Carlo simulations. To evaluate the expectation in (A:24), I
simulate W = 500 paths of the macro and latent factors, each of length  , based on the risk-
neutral dynamics described by equation (A:6). Like Bauer & Rudebusch (2013) and others, I
use antithetic sampling to construct the sequences of shocks to each of the factors in iteration
j by taking the negative of the shocks from iteration j  1. The resulting negative dependence
between sets of consecutive iterations helps reduce the variance of the estimators.2 I use these
simulated factor values to construct a time-series of expected shadow rates, equation (3:10),
and nominal rates, equation (3:2). Collecting allW paths allows for approximating bond prices
2Using antithetic sampling, each draw of shock sequences is no longer i.i.d.. Therefore, the covariance between
two consecutive draws is negative. This reduces the variance of the estimated yields, which are constructed by
averaging across the simulations.
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as: cP t = 1W
WX
j=1
exp
 
 
 1X
i=0
bRt+i (j)! ; (A.25)
where bRt+i (j) is the simulated path of short rates at iteration j. In the shadow model, yields
are still related to prices through Rt =   1 log (P t ) but now there is no closed-form expression
for P t . The measurement equation of the state space no longer maintains the linear structure
of equation (A:23), which is easily dealt with by Kalman ltering methods. However, by
construction, the shadow rate model collapses to a standard GATSM when interest rates are
su¢ ciently far from zero so that P (rt+h < 0) is very small and the ZLB does not present a
concern. Therefore, I utilize the linear expressions to estimate the parameters of the model
over a time when nancial markets operated normally away from the ZLB and the FFR could
be used e¤ectively as the primary monetary policy tool. From there, I use those parameter
values and lter through the nonlinear state space to extract the shadow rate when the ZLB
binds and nominal rates are censored. For these purposes, I dene cRt =   1 log cP t  andbRt = hdR1t ; :::; dRKt i0.
A.3 MCMC Algorithm for Drawing Parameters and Latent Factors
The full parameter set spanning all three models is organized into six di¤erent blocks:  and
, Q and Q, , ~A, R, M , and the short rate coe¢ cients a0 and b0. I implement Bayesian
Gibbs sampling steps when the priors are standard conjugates and thus generate conjugate
posteriors from which one can easily make draws. In the other cases, I use a Metropolis-
Hastings procedure to construct acceptance probabilities for the proposed values of each para-
meter block. After discarding 50,000 draws to achieve convergence, I use the following 50,000
post-burn-in draws to approximate the full joint posterior for all model parameters. The next
subsections present details on the prior parameterization. See Mikkelsen (2001) for an overview
of the methodology used to apply MCMC estimation of term structure models.
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A.3.1 Likelihood
Let Y = [Z;R], Z = [Z1; ::; ZT ]0, R = [R1; :::;RT ]0, and X = [X1; :::; XT ]0. The set of
model parameters to be estimated for all models is  =
 
; Q; ; Q;;R

where  and R
are the variance-covariance matrices of the error terms in the state equation for X and the
measurement equation for nominal interest rates, R. In the Macro-Monetary model, I must
also estimate ~A;and M . Additionally, the Macro-Finance model requires estimation of the
short rate coe¢ cients a0 and b0. The full likelihood of the model is:
p (Y j ) = p (Y j ;X) p (X j ) ; (A.26)
where the likelihood of the factors, p (X j ), can be expressed as the likelihood of a Gaussian
VAR due to the structure of the state transition equation. The data generating process of X
depends on the physical dynamics of the state vector and the variance-covariance matrix of the
state innovations, . The likelihood of the observed nominal interest rate data, conditional on
the factors X, depends upon the following parameters:
p (R j ;X) = p  R j Q; Q;;R; X :
This is a function of the risk-neutral parameters of the state dynamics and the covariance
matrix .
Finally, for the Macro-Monetary VAR model, the likelihood of the macro data conditional
on X depends upon the loadings linking ination and real activity to the shadow rate:
p (Y j ;X) = p

Y j ~A;M ; X

:
This is also the likelihood of a Gaussian VAR due to the FAVAR nature of the relationship
between the policy rate and macro uctuations.
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A.3.2 Drawing the Latent Factors (ft)
Bayesian estimation of dynamic state systems involves constructing the probability density
function (pdf) of the state variables, based on all available information. When the system
is linear, the Kalman lter allows for easy prediction and updating of the state each time
observable information becomes available since the pdf will be Gaussian at each step. However,
when we see a nonlinear relationship between the states and the observable variables, there
is generally no closed-form expression for the required pdf. Nonlinear Bayesian state space
estimation requires the EKF algorithm to recursively generate an approximation to the pdf
of the unobservable state variables. Here, I initially use the standard Kalman lter with the
linear state space representation of the state transition equation (3:4) and the measurement
equation (3:8). I iterate through the MCMC algorithm, alternating between ltering the latent
states and then estimating the model parameters, given these state values using data prior to
the ZLB period for this rst-step estimation. Since I identify the latent factor as having mean
zero, I impose this by centering each draw of ft around zero. After obtaining the parameter
estimates, I use the EKF to propagate the latent states forward through the ZLB period and
extract the model-implied shadow rate over the remainder of the sample. The EKF is detailed
in Appendix Section A.4.
A.3.3 Drawing the State Transition VAR Dynamics
One can draw the physical dynamics of Xt using standard Gibbs sampling with conjugate
normal priors for , imposing that  is a vector of zeros. Like Ang et al. (2007), I follow
Johannes & Polson (2005) in di¤erentiating between f; g and Q; Q	. Since the state
vector follows the VAR described by equation (A:1), the draws are standard Gibbs sampling
and I draw  separately for each equation in the state VAR. I specify the prior p () to be
N (0; 1000) which implies a natural conjugate normal posterior distribution.
I assume a dispersed inverse Wishart (IW) prior for the factor shock covariance matrix, .
Like the previous blocks of parameters, the conditional posterior of the factor shock covariance
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matrix  takes the following form:
P
 
 j _; X; Y
 / p (Y j ;X) p (X j ) p () ; (A.27)
where now _ denotes all parameters except for . Given an IW natural conjugate prior for
the factor shock covariance matrix, I draw the entire matrix in one Independence Metropolis
step from a conjugate IW proposal density: q () = p
 
X j ; _

p () where p () is an IW
prior. Therefore, the proposal draw (i) is accepted with probability:


(i);(i 1)

= min
(
p
 
Y j (i); _; X

p
 
X j (i); _

p
 
(i); _

q
 
(i 1)

p
 
Y j(i 1); _; X

p
 
X j (i 1); _

p
 
(i 1); _

q
 
(i)
 ; 1) ;
= min
(
p
 
Y j (i); _; X

p
 
Y j(i 1); _; X
 ; 1)
The transition density is then just the ratio of likelihoods of the new draw, (i), versus the old
draw, (i 1).
A.3.4 Drawing the Risk Neutral Dynamics
I assume at priors for the risk neutral parameters Q and Q. I draw each element of Q and
the relevant sections of each row of Q separately with a Random Walk Metropolis algorithm
and scale factors adjusted to tune the acceptance probabilities. Since the proposal draw comes
from a Random Walk step, the acceptance probabilities take the following forms:


Q(i 1); Q(i)

= min
(
p
 
Y j Q(i); _; X

p
 
Q(i)

p
 
Y j Q(i 1); _; X

p
 
Q(i 1)
 ; 1) ; (A.28)
and


Q(i 1); Q(i)

= min
(
p
 
Y j Q(i); _; X

p
 
Q(i)

p
 
Y j Q(i 1); _; X

p
 
Q(i 1)
 ; 1) : (A.29)
These probabilities are both the minimum of one and the posterior ratio of the model likelihood
times the ratio of priors for the new draw versus the old draw.
I do not specify separate priors for the market prices of risk. Instead I estimate the
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physical and risk-neutral dynamics separately and then invert to obtain 0 and 1 based on
the relationships in equations (A:7) and (A:8).
A.3.5 Drawing the Observable Dynamics
Assumed to follow a Gaussian system in the Macro-Monetary model, the evolution of observ-
able macro variables over time is described by equation (3:16), where ination and output
growth are functions of 12 of their own lags and 12 lags of the shadow monetary policy rate.
The macro block of the measurement equation also assumes a Gaussian VAR form and thus
I assume conjugate normal priors for ~A, given values for the other parameters. In addition,
I assume dispersed priors for the covariance matrices- an inverse Wishart (IW) prior for the
covariance of shocks in the macro VAR, M , and an inverse gamma (IG) prior for the measure-
ment errors associated with the observed nominal interest rates, R. Following from conjugate
normal priors for ~A, I again can implement standard Gibbs sampling steps to draw from the
conjugate normal posteriors for both lag polynomial coe¢ cient matrices. The variances of
the two blocks of measurement errors can be drawn directly from the conditional posterior
distribution for R and M . I use the standard Gibbs sampling algorithm since conditional
on the data, the latent factors, and the other parameters in the model, the measurement errors
are orthogonal to the model. Thus the conditional posterior for R is the natural conjugate
IG distribution and the conditional posterior for M is the natural conjugate IW distribution,
from both of which I easily make draws:
R j ;X; Y  IG
 
T + a0
2
; b0 +
1
2
TX
t=1
"2t
!
; (A.30)
M j ;X; Y  IW

^M ; T + c0

: (A.31)
A.3.6 Estimation of the Short Rate Dynamics
The policy rate reaction function gives a preliminary basis for how much of the yield curve
movements are associated with macro factors and thus how much is attributed to unobservable
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factors. In the Macro-Finance model, I initialize by and b at their OLS estimates using
the e¤ective FFR as the policy rate and then propose a random walk Metropolis Hastings
algorithm to determine the loadings on ination and real activity in the short rate expression
individually. The acceptance probability resembles that described by expression (A:28). I
then allow the MCMC iterations to gauge whether the macroeconomic data contributes to
describing yield curve uctuations and to disentangle the feedback mechanism between policy-
setting, macroeconomic dynamics, and nancial markets. Rather than separately drawing a0,
I construct the model implied short rate to match the sample mean of the FFR. In each Gibbs
iteration, I set the value of a0 according to: a0 = R   b00X, where R is the mean of the FFR
and X includes the time-series means of the factors. Since f and b0 are drawn within each
iteration, a0 is updated at each step.
A.4 Extended Kalman Filter
Estimating the two latent state variables underlying the yield curve dynamics requires use
of the extended kalman lter (henceforth EKF). The state variables evolve according to a
Gaussian VAR transition equation but the relationship between the states and the observable
interest rates is nonlinear and prohibits the use of standard kalman ltering methods. The
nonlinearity is introduced due to the added complexity of the shadow rate model accounting
for censoring at zero and thus introduces a type of truncated distribution for observed rates.
I nd it appropriate in this case to apply the EKF rather than more complicated nonlinear
particle ltering methods because when the observed short rate is positive, the model collapses
to an a¢ ne term structure model based upon a linear foundation. The EKF constructs a local
linearization of the transition and measurement equations to approximate the nonlinearity
encountered with the equations relating market interest rates to Xt through the expressions
for the shadow bond prices.
The EKF proceeds like the standard Kalman lter with a series of predicting and updating
steps for the state variables, incorporating new observed information at each point in time.
One can generalize the state space as a combination of the state transition and measurement
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equations:
Xt = Xt 1 + "t ; (A.32)
Yt = h (Xt) + vt; vt  N
 
0;Y

(A.33)
Rt =  
1

log
cP t  : (A.34)
This format illustrates the nonlinear nature of the function relating Xt to the observable
interest rates, h (Xt). This function also includes the Gaussian VAR linking macro dynamics
to the latent state variables when macro variables are included in the measurement equation
in the Macro-Monetary Model. In the general EKF algorithm, the pdf of state variables given
the observable data is approximated by a Gaussian for each iteration t = 1:::T :
p (Xt 1 j Y1:t 1) = N
 
Xt 1;Xt 1jt 1; Pt 1jt 1

; (A.35)
p (Xt j Y1:t 1) = N
 
Xt;Xtjt 1; Ptjt 1

; (A.36)
p (Xt j Y1:t) = N
 
Xt;Xtjt; Ptjt

; (A.37)
where Xt:t and Pt:t are the updated estimates of the state and state covariance matrix, re-
spectively, and Xt:t 1 and Pt:t 1 are the predictions. Since I model the state dynamics as a
Gaussian VAR, this step follows exactly as in the standard Kalman lter. The only nonlin-
earity is introduced in the measurement equation for interest rates. Here, the updating steps
will require an approximation. The steps proceed as follows:
Xtjt 1 = Xt 1; (A.38)
Ptjt 1 =  + P 0t 1jt 1; (A.39)
Xtjt = Xtjt 1 +Kt
 Yt   h  Xtjt 1 ; (A.40)
Ptjt = Ptjt 1  KtMtPtjt 1; (A.41)
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where the local linearizations of the nonlinear function h (Xt) are:
Ht =
dh (X)
dX

X=Xtjt 1
; (A.42)
Kt = Ptjt 1H 0tZ
 1
t ; (A.43)
Zt = HtPtjt 1H 0t + 
Y : (A.44)
I approximate the derivative of cRt =   1 log cP t  numerically with respect to each of the state
variables. In the Macro-Monetary Model specication, I also need to consider the derivative
of the added convolution from the macro VAR dynamics:
yt
xt;i
=

ARZ (L)

1;i
; (A.45)
t
xt;i
=

ARZ (L)

2;i
; (A.46)
for i = f1; 2; 3g. Stacking these derivatives produces the approximate coe¢ cient matrix for
the extended Kalman lter algorithm.
66
APPENDIX B TABLES AND FIGURES
Table B.1: Bayes Factor Test for Parameter Instability in U.S. Monetary Policy
Je¤reys scale for evidence in favor of parameter instability in VAR(4) coe¢ cients
Change in responses to policy rate in 2008:I Full-Sample Post-Great Moderation
(1960  2013) (1984  2013)
1. Federal Funds Rate 7:78 14:15
2. FFR w/ Lagged Changes in Balance Sheet 56:58 27:35
and Policy Announcement E¤ects
3. Krippner Shadow Rate  46:00  15:96
4. Wu-Xia Shadow Rate 14:34 3:77
Table B.1: Bayes Factor Comparison for Parameter Instability. Comparison of log marginal
likelihoods of models allowing for parameter instability in the response of macro variables to
various measures of the policy rate: 1. the e¤ective nominal FFR, 2. the FFR with controls for
changes in the size of the Fed balance sheet and policy announcement e¤ects, 3. the shadow
rate of Krippner (2012), and 4. the shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2014). We compare one
model assuming constant parameters in the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods with another allowing
for shifts in the response of all variables to lags of the policy rate. We compute an adjusted
Bayes Factor which can be interpreted as follows: * indicates positive evidence in favor of the
model with parameter instability, ** indicates strong evidence, and *** indicates very strong
evidence.
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Table B.2: Kullback-Leibler Divergence
Benchmark: 1960:I-2007:IV
Alternative: Full-Sample ZLB
(1960  2013) (2008  2013)
Federal Funds Rate 28:70 182:74
Krippner Shadow Rate 32:10 123:45
Wu-Xia Shadow Rate 30:20 187:49
Benchmark: 1984:I-2007:IV
Alternative: Post-Great Moderation ZLB
(1984  2013) (2008  2013)
Federal Funds Rate 55:68 110:93
Krippner Shadow Rate 60:30 93:79
Wu-Xia Shadow Rate 63:64 121:15
Table B.2: Kullback-Leibler Divergence between the posterior distributions of the VAR pa-
rameters estimated with the benchmark data, using the FFR, and the posterior distributions
when estimating the model using full-sample instrument combining the FFR and shadow rate
policy measurements. We compare the distributions to either the full pre-ZLB benchmark
(1960:I-2007:IV) or the Post-Great Moderation benchmark (1984:I-2007:IV).
Table B.3: Priors for MCMC estimation algorithm
Parameter Prior Distribution Hyper-parameters
 N (0; 1000)
Q; Q N (0; 1)
~A N (0; 10)

 IW (0; c0) 0 = IN
c0 = N
 + 2
M IW
 
M0 ; d0

M0 = 10 I2
d0 = M
 + 2
R IG (e0; f0) e0 = 0:01
f0 = 0:01
b0 N (0; 1)
Table B.3: Prior parameterization for MCMC estimation algorithm. With this prior speci-
cation, we initialize the state equation dynamics in all models and the Macro-Monetary VAR
portion of the measurement equation with OLS estimates of the coe¢ cient matrices.
**N= number of state variables (3)
***M= number of observable macro variables in VAR (2)
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Table B.4: Root-MSE of Term Structure Estimates
3 mo. 6 mo. 1 yr. 2 yr. 3 yr. 4 yr. 5 yr. Spread: 5 yr. 3 mo.
Pre-ZLB (Filtered 01/1985-12/2008)
Macro-Finance 0:68 0:51 0:51 0:62 0:56 0:66 1:70 1:38
Macro-Monetary 0:38 0:23 0:08 0:19 0:51 1:10 1:91 1:71
Finance 0:29 0:25 0:25 0:35 0:53 0:96 1:59 1:38
ZLB (Filtered 01/2009-03/2014)
Macro-Finance 0:11 0:18 0:31 0:52 0:46 0:24 1:08 1:18
Macro-Monetary 0:08 0:09 0:14 0:11 0:32 0:60 1:03 1:04
Finance 0:10 0:08 0:08 0:39 0:60 0:72 0:87 0:87
Table B.4: Root mean-squared errors between the model-implied yields and the observed data
over the pre-ZLB period (01/1985 - 12/2008) and ZLB period (01/2009 - 03/2014). The
model-implied yields are computed using the ltered latent state values and the observed
macro factors over this period.
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Figure B.1: Impulse Responses Over the Full Sample with the FFR - Left panel: Benchmark
IRF with FFR 1960:I-2007:IV: VAR(4) with GDP, CPI, Commodity Prices, and FFR as the
policy instrument. This column gives the VAR results using data from 1960:I-2007:IV and
serves as our baseline "truth" during normal, non-ZLB environments. The thick blue line
and the blue shaded area show the median point estimate and the 68% posterior coverage,
respectively, for the impulse responses to a 25 basis point shock to the policy instrument.
Right panel: IRF of full-sample VAR which extends the dataset from 1960:I-2013:III and
continues using the FFR as the policy instrument through the ZLB period. The thick green
line and the green shaded area give the median IRF point estimates and 68% posterior coverage,
respectively, incorporating data through the ZLB period without accounting for any potential
changing macroeconomic dynamics. The thick blue line and the blue shaded region replicate
the plots from the benchmark model.
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Figure B.2: Impulse Responses Over the Full Sample with the FFR and Balance Sheet and
Policy Announcement E¤ects - Left panel: Benchmark IRF with FFR 1960:I-2007:IV: VAR(4)
with GDP, CPI, Commodity Prices, and FFR as the policy instrument. This column gives the
VAR results using data from 1960:I-2007:IV and serves as our baseline "truth" during normal,
non-ZLB environments. The thick blue line and the blue shaded area show the median point
estimate and the 68% posterior coverage, respectively, for the impulse responses to a 25 basis
point shock to the policy instrument. Right panel: IRF of full-sample VAR which extends
the dataset from 1960:I-2013:III and uses the FFR to represent the policy instrument during
the ZLB period but also includes controls for changes in the size of the Feds balance sheet
as well as policy announcement e¤ects over this time. The thick green line and the green
shaded area give the median IRF point estimates and 68% posterior coverage, respectively,
incorporating data through the ZLB period without accounting for any potential changing
macroeconomic dynamics. The thick blue line and the blue shaded region replicate the plots
from the benchmark model.
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Figure B.3: Plot of quarterly nominal FFR and estimated shadow rates over the period from
2006:I - 2013:III. The shaded area highlights the Great Recession period in the US.
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Figure B.4: Impulse Responses Over the Full Sample with Shadow Rates - Left panel: Bench-
mark IRF with FFR 1960:I-2007:IV: VAR(4) with GDP, CPI, Commodity Prices, and FFR as
the policy instrument. This column gives the VAR results using data from 1960:I-2007:IV and
serves as our baseline "truth" during normal, non-ZLB environments. The thick blue line and
the blue shaded area show the median point estimate and the 68% posterior coverage, respec-
tively, for the impulse responses to a 25 basis point shock to the policy instrument. Center
panel: IRF of full-sample VAR which extends the dataset from 1960:I-2013:III and uses the
Krippner (2012) shadow rate as the policy instrument through the ZLB period. The thick
green line and the green shaded area give the median IRF point estimates and 68% posterior
coverage, respectively, incorporating data through the ZLB period. The thick blue line and
the blue shaded region replicate the plots from the benchmark model. Right panel: IRF of
full-sample VAR which uses the Wu and Xia (2014) shadow rate as the policy instrument
through the ZLB period.
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Figure B.5: Impulse Responses in the ZLB Environment with Shadow Rates- Left panel:
Benchmark IRF with FFR 1960:I-2007:IV: VAR(4) with GDP, CPI, Commodity Prices, and
FFR as the policy instrument. This column gives the VAR results using data from 1960:I-
2007:IV and serves as our baseline "truth" during normal, non-ZLB environments. The thick
blue line and the blue shaded area show the median point estimate and the 68% posterior
coverage, respectively, for the impulse responses to a 25 basis point shock to the policy instru-
ment. Center panel: IRF of VAR(4) using data from the ZLB period only, 2008:I-2013:III,
and using the Krippner (2012) shadow rate as the policy instrument. The thick green line
and the green shaded area give the median IRF point estimates and 68% posterior coverage,
respectively, using only data from the ZLB period. The thick blue line and the blue shaded
region replicate the plots from the benchmark model. Right panel: IRF of VAR(4) using data
from the ZLB period only, 2008:I-2013:III, and using the Wu and Xia (2014) shadow rate as
the policy instrument.
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Figure B.6: Monthly macro data on real activity, measured by the unemployment gap (CBO
estimate of the natural rate of unemployment minus the observed unemployment rate), and
core CPI ination from 01/1985-03/2014.
Figure B.7: Plot of e¤ective FFR and all three ltered shadow rates from prior to the nancial
crisis through the end of the sample: 01/2006 through 03/2014. The shaded area indicates
the NBER-dated recession period. The vertical bars highlight specic dates on which the Fed
announced its unconventional policy programs.
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Figure B.8: E¤ective FFR with the model-implied shadow rate from the Finance model and
the Wu & Xia (2014) shadow rate. Both models include three latent factors and no macro
data. The shadow rate time series splice together the observed values of the e¤ective FFR
from 01/2000 through 12/2008 with the shadow rate values from 01/2009 through 03/2014.
Figure B.9: Plot of e¤ective FFR, Macro-Finance shadow rate, the systematic component of
the shadow rate describing the policy rule, and the unobserved factor representing shocks to
policy from 01/2000 through 03/2014. The shaded areas indicates the NBER-dated recession
periods.
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Figure B.10: Simulated future paths of the shadow rate from each model specication. The
projections are based upon market expectations of the shadow rate at the end of the sample,
03/2014, and the factors are simulated forward for ve years, based upon the risk neutral
dynamics in equation (26). The expected shadow rate is described by equation (3). The blue
line represents this MC estimated mean and the bands give the 95% posterior coverage.
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